Systemic Approach to Improve Learning from Incidents by Guarguati Ariza, Juliana Andrea
  
 
 
SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO IMPROVE LEARNING FROM INCIDENTS 
 
A Thesis 
by 
JULIANA ANDREA GUARGUATI ARIZA  
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
Chair of Committee,  M. Sam Mannan 
Committee Members, Mahmoud El-Halwagi 
 S. Camille Peres 
Head of Department, M. Nazmul Karim 
 
May 2017 
 
Major Subject: Safety Engineering 
 
Copyright 2017 Juliana Andrea Guarguati Ariza
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Learning from incidents has always been very challenging for industry and 
regulators due to the associated complexity in human and organizational behavior. In 
spite of the efforts and resources spent on incident investigation processes and 
organizational learning techniques, the outcome has not shown a significant 
improvement. Chemical process incidents such as Texas City Refinery explosion, T2 
Laboratories explosion, and West Fertilizer explosion continue to occur. It is evident that 
as an industry, organizations are continually failing to learn from the past incidents. The 
question is if organizations are ready to learn, are they following the right learning 
approach? Organizations should adopt a systemic learning approach where the collected 
knowledge is leveraged in order to enhance the performance of the safety management 
systems and consequently prevent future incidents. The objective of this research is set 
to enhance our understanding on how a company and the industry as a whole learn from 
past incidents and define the key elements to improve the systemic learning.  This study 
was divided into four main phases: identification of the learning system, development of 
a learning process and a proposed incident investigation process and finally the 
validation of the proposed incident investigation process through a case study. 
First, the learning system for the chemical and oil and gas industry, the different 
types of learning, and the entities involved in it has been characterized. Based on the 
results, some limitations on the system were identified and discussed. Secondly, a 
systemic process for improving learning from incidents has been developed based on the 
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identified limitations of the learning system. The proposed process provides a holistic 
view of the learning process and explored the concept of knowledge management into 
safety systems. Likewise, it provides guidelines of how learning systems can be 
executed within the organization and how to support the implementation of safety 
knowledge inside of it. Third, an incident investigation process has been proposed to 
provide additional sources of information into the analysis, in order to support the 
identification of root causes and the required changes in the management systems of the 
organization. The process that has been developed enhances understanding of how to get 
information and transform it into valuable recommendations that can be implemented in 
their processes. Finally, the proposed process has been explained through a case study. 
The obtained results provide a clear picture of how an incident investigation report can 
be enhanced through this process.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Motivation 
In the chemical and oil and gas industry, organizations and regulators have spent 
a significant effort into incident investigation processes and organizational learning 
techniques in order to improve continually, avoid the same mistakes, and consequently 
prevent incidents. In spite of these efforts, the outcome has not shown a significant 
improvement and process safety incidents continue to occur. According to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics [1], over the five years period from 2010 to 2014, there were 758 
fatalities in the chemical and oil and gas industry (the statistics covers the following 
sectors: manufacturing, oil and gas extraction, drilling oil and gas wells, support 
activities for oil and gas operations, and petroleum refineries) [1]. Likewise, in 2014, an 
estimated 46,200 nonfatal injuries and illnesses were reported [1]. These statistics 
suggest that the industry as a whole is failing to learn from the past incidents. Learning 
from incidents provides organizations the required knowledge to improve safety 
management systems and prevent future incidents, by understanding what went wrong in 
past incidents, analyzing their lessons learned and implementing the necessary changes 
into their processes.  
During the last three decades, the industry has seen significant process safety 
incidents that have been precursors of changes in regulations and standards in United 
States and the rest of the world. However, there is a failure to successfully implement 
and enforce those changes and make them transcend over the years. Thus, process safety 
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incidents become part of the history and the industry is doomed to repeat the same 
mistakes. Without doubt, no process safety incident has been as harmful as Bhopal 
disaster in 1984, due to the enormous impact in terms of fatalities, financial losses, 
environmental damage, and industry reputation. This incident made organizations realize 
the importance of learning from incidents not only inside the organization, but also 
learning from external incidents that may be applicable to their operations. While no 
other incident has been as devastating as Bhopal incident, there have been several 
disasters over the last decades that have had significant impact on the industry and from 
which the same mistakes can be identified over and over again.  
During the same year as Bhopal disaster, in San Juan, Mexico City a catastrophic 
fire and series of explosions at an LPG terminal killed over 500 people, injured 7,000 
and more than 200,000 people were evacuated [2]. The day of the incident, LPG leaked 
from a pipeline rupture, which formed a vapor cloud that dispersed into the surrounding 
for about 10 minutes. The vapor cloud ignited and a flash fire resulted causing a violent 
shock, resulting in a series of BLEVEs and minor explosions in nearby houses and 
facilities in the area [3]. Some of the causes and contributing factors of this incident 
were that no hazard identification process was carried out for the unit and there was a 
lack of awareness regarding the associated hazard not only from the organization but 
also the community and the emergency responders. Likewise, there was a lack of 
effective land use planning due to the lack of regulations to control the construction of 
residential houses around the facility. In addition, the incident showed an inadequate 
mechanical integrity program as one of the root causes of the incident. Moreover, there 
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was a lack of emergency response planning and training regarding hazard identification. 
Due to the substantial impact of this incident, the same causes and contributing factors 
were expected to be learned collectively within the organization. However, this 
organization reveals a failure to learn from its own history. The safety performance of 
the organization over the last ten years exposes an estimated 197 incidents and 21 
fatalities per year [4, 5]. In these process safety incidents mechanical integrity, 
inadequate land use planning, and inadequate emergency response were identified as 
contributing factors.  
Similarly, process safety incidents such as West Fertilizer explosion (2013) in 
which a fire and explosion of ammonium nitrate killed 15 people including 12 
emergency responders, injured more than 260 people and severely damaged the nearby 
community [6].  Another incident, Tianjin explosion (2015) in which a series of 
explosions in a warehouse killed 173 people, 110 of them first responders, injured more 
than 797 people and damaged around 17,000 houses [7]. In both incidents, the same 
contributing factors as Mexico City disaster such as poor hazard awareness, inadequate 
land use planning, and inadequate emergency planning were identified. Even though 
these incidents do not have the same causes as in Mexico City incident, it is evident that 
the same contributing factors increased their severity. Both examples illustrate a lack of 
organizational memory and an inability to effectively share and implement lessons 
learned.  
As can be seen, organizations have failed to recognize and learn effectively from 
past process safety incidents. In addition, the knowledge that is embedded into those 
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incidents has been lost over the years, making it difficult for new generations to 
understand the reasons behind the implementation of those lessons learned. The 
incidents showed in the previous examples reflect a lack of an effective management 
system, which enables organizations to learn, adapt and grow [8]. This suggests having 
an effective learning system that serves as a source of knowledge by the acquisition of 
relevant information, the analysis of it and the use of this information to improve and 
prevent process safety incidents. The question is if organizations have the required 
information, are they following the right learning approach? Organizations should adopt 
a systemic learning approach where the collected safety knowledge is leveraged in order 
to enhance safety management systems and make the lessons learned part of their 
culture.  
 
1.2. Background 
The study of how organizations learn from incidents and manage safety to 
prevent process safety incidents is not a new topic within the process safety research 
area. However, this field has gained more attention during the last sixteen years and 
more disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and engineering have been studying it. 
As a result, learning from incidents has become a fragmented field in which different 
approaches have been proposed for specific scenarios or situations such as a certain part 
of the learning process, the group of interest or the industry in which it is applied. Back 
in the 70s, the theory on organizational learning proposed by Argyris and Schön 
highlighted the importance of learning to detect and respond to undesirable events [9]. 
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The theory suggested two modes of learning: single and double-loop learning. Even 
though, both modes of learning are necessary, the authors emphasized the importance of 
achieving double-loop learning to identify organizational and systemic failures [10]. 
This theory is still accepted and has been widely recognized in this field despite current 
advances in organizational learning theories [11]. Lukic ‘research supports this theory by 
the analysis of the type of learning that is adopted in organizations, in which incidents 
usually are a combination of technical, human, and organizational factors, making single 
and double-loop essential factors to accomplish successful learning [12]. Likewise, 
Choularton demonstrated how double-loop learning could be to avoid superficial 
learning [13]. 
Over the years, learning from incidents has been categorized into several areas of 
study such as lessons learned, incident investigation and analysis, learning from incident 
process, and conditions for learning [11]. Kletz has been one the pioneers of introducing 
lessons learned from process safety incidents into organizational systems and 
introducing real examples of how organizations failed and how to overcome these types 
of failures. Furthermore, the author discussed how organizations have no memory and 
the need to share and implement lesson learned [14, 15]. Aligned with this author, 
several studies have also suggested that significant improvement have been made in the 
development of lessons learned. However, the dissemination and implementation of 
lessons learned inhibit the complete learning process [16-18]. Moreover, the literature 
provides guideline of how to develop lessons learned, how to enhance the dissemination 
process and how lessons learned can be embedded into the organization [17].  
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Incident investigation and analysis represents one of the most critical steps in the 
learning process due to the challenges that may arise from the identification of root 
causes in process safety incidents. Lukic stated the importance of identifying appropriate 
approaches to analyze incidents depending of the complexity of them and provided 
solutions within the proper domain [12]. Similarly, research by Lindberg, Hansson and 
Rollenhagen explored the literature with respect of incident investigation process and 
proposed the CHAIN model based on six basic criteria for incident investigation. The 
model argued the importance of studying the effectiveness and effects of different 
incident investigation methods in order to apply appropriate techniques and improve the 
experience feedback process [19]. In the same context, Fahlbruch and Schöbel presented 
the Safety through organizational learning (SOL) method in which a standardized 
process for analyzing incidents in a holistic socio-technical approach have been 
proposed to support incident investigation analysis [20]. 
Regarding learning from incidents processes, several frameworks have been 
proposed with the objective of increasing effectiveness in learning. Lukic proposed a 
framework for development of learning initiatives in organizations. The framework 
identified five elements that organizations should analyze to select the appropriate 
approach for learning: participants, learning process, type of incident, type of knowledge 
and learning context [21]. Although the framework proposes valuable initiatives, it does 
not identify how its initiatives are linked to a system that can be implemented in 
organizations. Similarly, Coze proposed a framework that integrated the different 
approaches from which learning have been analyzed. The framework provided a bigger 
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picture of this field and highlighted the main elements that influence learning such as 
actors, countries, steps, industry, disciplines and intensity of the event [22]. Conversely, 
semi-quantitative studies have been conducted to determine the expected behavior of 
learning from incidents within an organization over time. Cooke proposed a model to 
show the dynamic of the system, how each element operates and serves as a continuous 
improvement process. The model also suggested how incident-learning systems serves 
as a bridge between accident causation theory and high reliability theory [8]. Likewise, 
Avnet analyzed the expected behavior of shared knowledge over time by the validation 
of share knowledge networks within the offshore oil and gas industry [23]. 
Literature regarding condition for learning described relevant factors that 
influence the effectiveness of learning processes. Conditions such as trust, culture of no 
blame, people involvement and information availability have been identified as 
necessary conditions to increase reporting and enhance learning [11, 24]. In this context, 
studies explored the potential impact of learning at multiple levels and the need of better 
tools for incident investigation analysis [25]. Likewise, the literature emphasizes the 
need to create resilience organizations in order to been able to adapt to and absorb 
changes once an incident occurred [26]. In the same way, studies suggested the need of 
involvement of new groups of experts to incorporate new insights into the field of 
learning [27]. With respect to learning effectiveness measures within organizations, 
Jacobson presented a method for evaluating the level of learning in terms of how broadly 
the lessons learned are implemented, how much the organization is involved in this 
process and for how long the lessons learned last within the organization [28]. Similarly, 
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studies suggested different learning criteria to analyze and identify potential areas of 
opportunity within the learning process [29, 30]. Finally, Naot proposed a method to 
analyze the effectiveness of organizational learning after an incident occurred. The 
method incorporated twenty-two performance indicators of the learning process, which 
determines the quality of the organizational learning system within the organization [31].  
1.3. Objectives 
This research aims to develop a comprehensive approach to integrated the main 
stages of the learning process and enhance incident investigation processes. This is done 
with the objective of providing a holistic and systemic view of the learning from 
incidents process and exploring the concept of knowledge management into safety 
learning systems. This research incorporates a psychology and engineering viewpoint in 
order to provide an overall analysis of learning systems in the chemical and oil and gas 
industry. Moreover, it provides more insights into the implementation of learning 
systems within the organization. In this context, the specific objectives of this research 
are:  
 
 Identify the limitations in the learning system for the chemical and oil and gas 
industry and provide recommendations to guide organizations on how to overcome 
the identified limitations on the learning system. 
 Enhanced understanding of how to learn form process safety incidents and how to 
develop learning from incidents systems that enable organizations to improve 
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internal learning. Additionally, to identify the key elements organizations should 
take into account to improve this learning.  
 Develop a framework to determine how organizations can improve the internal 
learning process and transferring knowledge. It will provide a systemic approach to 
improve learning from incidents and will serves as a guideline for organizations on 
how corporate learning systems can be executed within the organization and how to 
support the implementation of safety knowledge inside of it.  
1.4. Thesis organization 
This thesis involves four main phases: identification of the learning system, 
development of the learning process, development of a proposed incident investigation 
process and finally the validation of the proposed incident investigation process through 
a case study. 
The first phase reviews the organizational learning theory and relevant concepts 
for the development of the following sections. It also discusses the barriers that inhibit 
organizational learning, factors that influence learning, and the different types of 
learning methods that organizations can apply. Moreover, reviews the incident 
investigation terminology and process. It also provides a general description of some 
relevant incident investigation methodologies. Finally, this phase discusses the learning 
system and the limitations that can be identified on it. 
The second phase of this research introduces the proposed learning process and 
examines each element of it. It also shows how a corporate learning system should 
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operate and the key elements that organizations needs to take into account during its 
implementation. 
The third phase of this thesis introduces a more detailed analysis of the first step 
in the proposed learning process: enhance internal information. It examines the incident 
investigation process and methodologies throughout the development of a task analysis 
and a comprehensive analysis of the current incident investigation process. It also 
presents the proposed incident investigation process and provides a description of each 
of the incorporated steps.  
Finally, the last phase analyzes an incident that occurred in the offshore industry 
in North America. The incident has been examined through the proposed incident 
investigation process showed in the previous section. The analysis comprises the 
analysis of two external incidents with similar causes and three internal incidents that 
occurred in the same organization. It should be noted that the incident investigation has 
been performed by the organization at the time where the incident occurred. Therefore, 
the objective of this analysis is to identify improving opportunities of the final report 
through the analysis of similar incidents in the industry. The explained methodology is 
presented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 Thesis methodology  
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2. ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
 
2.1. Organizational learning  
Organizational learning needs to be understood from the social and systemic 
perspective, since it emerges from the internal and external interactions among 
individuals, technology and cultures. Thus, learning is not limited to the acquisition of 
technical knowledge; it also requires the analysis and interpretation of the context where 
the knowledge is going to be applied, and the understanding of human behavior and 
social interactions that emerge in an organization [32]. As a result, this field has been 
very challenging for the academia and industry, since the outcome is always going to be 
different from organization to organization and even in the same organization, among 
generations. Then, the real challenge is to transcend from the individual to the 
organizational learning, in order to ensure that the knowledge has become part of the 
culture of the organization regardless the people that are part of it. Individual learning 
refers to the enhancement of individual mental models, through the acquisition of new or 
modified knowledge, which subsequently guide human behavior and decision-making 
[33]. Once the individual learning is achieved, this knowledge has to be stored, 
communicated and implemented through the organization, so it can be available and 
easily retrieved once it is required by another person, and consequently ensure 
organizational learning.  
Organizational learning is explained based on the individual learning theory, in 
which learning is shown by the accumulation of individual learning that is reflected as 
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routine actions and values on behalf of the organization [33]. Therefore, individual 
learning set the foundations of this theory, and then the organizational components are 
added to gain a better understanding of the expected outcome. As stated by Fiol and 
Lyes, organizational learning can be defined as a “change in the organization’s 
knowledge that occurs as a function of experience” [34]. Likewise, in the technical view, 
organizational learning is described as “the effective processing, interpretation of, and 
response to, information both inside and outside the organization” 1999 [32]. Finally, as 
assert by Huber, “an entity learns if, through its processing of information, the range of 
its potential behaviors is changed… an organization learns if any of its unit acquires 
knowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful to the organization” [32, 35] . Based 
on the previous aforementioned, it can be concluded that organizational learning is the 
process in which the knowledge is acquired for both outside and inside the organization, 
is organized, analyzed and finally, applied in the organization. Moreover, it is expected 
that this learning, changes human behaviors and gain experience for the organization.  
Learning is a continuous process and varies depending of the size of the ‘unit’ 
that is getting the knowledge, i.e. employee, a department or an industry. Thus, 
organizations gain knowledge in the following units of learning: individual, groups, 
organizations, and inter organizations [36]. This learning is incremental as shown is 
Figure 2.  Individual and organizational learning have already explained in the previous 
paragraphs. However, between them, the group learning is present, which refers to a 
group that gains knowledge together through the interaction and experience with another 
individual [37]. As an example of group learning we can identify a group people from 
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different departments, sharing the lessons learned from case study.  On the other hand, 
organizational learning is not the ultimate goal to understand the learning system as a 
whole. The final level of learning is the inter-organizational learning, in which different 
organizations share, communicate and learn together from experience. For the purpose 
of this research this type of learning refers to the industry learning, more specifically, the 
chemical and oil and gas industry learning.  
 
 
Figure 2 Units of learning 
 
2.2. Single and double loop learning 
Learning from experience is also explained based on the concepts of single-loop 
and double-loop. This model is based upon “theory of action” and “theory of use”, 
developed by Argyris and Schön [38]. The model stated how people act based on their 
mental maps and therefore how they plan, execute and evaluate their actions [38]. These 
theories suggested three elements or stages of the learning experience, as shown in 
Figure 3.  
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 Governing variables describes why people do what they do. Those are the main 
values, beliefs and conceptual frameworks that are rooted to their cultural 
background [39]. 
 Actions describe what people do. Actions are the plans and strategies used by 
people according to their governing variables. These strategies are executed in 
order to keep their governing variables within acceptable limits [39]. 
 Results describe the consequences or what people obtain from their actions. These 
results can be both intended or unintended [39]. 
 
 
Figure 3 Single-loop and double-loop learning, adapted from [39] 
 
Single-loop refers to the learning process in which the actions are modified based 
on the expected results or consequences obtained. This type of learning involves the 
recognition of an undesired outcome and the modification of the actions that leads to it. 
It also can be defined as the correction of an error by changing the strategy of actions. In 
the single-loop learning the governing variables remain unchanged. Conversely, double-
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loop learning requires an additional step in which the governing variables are questioned 
and evaluated in order to develop changes from the values, policies and objectives of the 
organization [39]. 
The literature suggested that most of the organizations act according to single-
loop learning [40], in which operators spend their time focusing on how to correct 
immediate actions to avoid the same mistake. But no actual analysis is performed to 
detect the root causes of the incident and consequently, determine if a change in the 
system is required or not. On the contrary, double-loop learning requires organizations to 
develop critical thinking, in which subject matter experts should analyze the situation 
and challenge the existing rules governing the organization. In conclusion, double-loop 
learning allows organizations to identify root causes instead of intermediary causes and 
therefore, prevent recurring in the same type of incidents. Moreover, single-loop 
learning can limit organizations to only solve the symptoms of the actual organizational 
causes.  
 
2.3. Organizational processes 
2.3.1. Knowledge  
Knowledge is the outcome of learning [41]. Knowledge is defined as the 
transformation of information, in which expert opinion, skills, and experience have been 
accumulated. Knowledge is the synthesis of multiple resources of information over time, 
in order to understand patterns and support decision-making [42, 43]. Thus, the 
organizational learning objective is to enhance the knowledge that is acquired by the 
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employees and make sure that this knowledge is successfully stored and transferred 
among the whole organization.  
Knowledge can be categorized into two forms: explicit and tacit knowledge. 
Explicit knowledge refers to what people knows and can be explained by individuals. 
This type of knowledge is relatively easy to store, identify, and retrieve [44, 45]. Explicit 
knowledge transfer can be verbal or written. Examples of explicit knowledge are reports, 
procedures or case studies. The challenge with this type of knowledge is to ensure the 
availability of the information as needed [46]. In contrast, tactic knowledge refers to 
know-how [45, 47]. This type of knowledge is personal in nature; this implies that the 
knowledge remains in the heads of individuals that are part of the organization. 
Therefore, tacit knowledge is hard to extract and is mostly experience based. Tacit 
knowledge can be transferred through training, practices, and experience [46].  
Examples of tacit knowledge are the skills and expertise acquired by an employee or the 
values and cultural beliefs of an employee.  
2.3.2. Knowledge transfer 
Knowledge transfer is no longer considered as an act [48]. Instead, it is 
considered as a process in which, organizations gather valuable information and 
experiences from one entity to another, within the organization and among them [49]. 
Those entities can vary depending of the number of people involved, such as groups, 
departments, and facilities. The challenge with transferring knowledge is to transcend 
from individual level to higher levels, in order to ensure that knowledge has been 
implemented through the organization. Moreover, assessing how effectively 
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organizations are transferring knowledge is a difficult task, due to the complexity of 
measuring changes in knowledge and performance of the recipient entity [50]. 
Transferring knowledge in organizations required the combination and 
interconnection among three elements: members, tools, and tasks. By combining those 
elements through the process, organizations can create knowledge management system, 
where the knowledge can be stored in the organization through generations.  
The process of transfer knowledge starts with the externalization, in which the 
person or team must find the best method or approach to deliver the knowledge they 
want to transfer. In this stage, the tacit knowledge has to be converting into explicit 
knowledge so it can be delivered verbally or in written form. Second, the integration, in 
which the knowledge is adapted and analyzed based on the context where it is going to 
be applied. Finally, internalization, in which, the new knowledge is applied and 
incorporated into the system [51, 52].  However, this process does not ensure that the 
transfer knowledge is going to be successful.  
Additionally, there are barriers involved in the process that makes it more 
complex and therefore, makes the expecting outcome unpredictable in some cases. Some 
of those barriers are explained below:  
 Receiver of the knowledge: the effectiveness of the transfer process depends on 
who the intended receiver are, how familiar they are with the knowledge they will 
get, and the context where it is applied. The similarity of task and context between 
the transferring entity and the receiver entity determines how complex the process 
and the type of technique they should implement. Likewise, it is important to 
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understand the background of the receiver, in terms of the experience and technical 
knowledge that they have, in order to define the best approach to deliver the 
knowledge [52]. 
 Nature of the task: another barrier that involved in the process is the nature of the 
task, referring to how frequent a task is performed and if the task is a routine or not 
activity. The nature of the task enables us to understand how familiar the 
employees are with it and the type of system they are approaching [52]. 
 Type of knowledge: the complexity of the process differs significantly depending 
of the type of knowledge that will be transferred. The knowledge can be tacit or 
explicit knowledge, and as mention before, explicit knowledge is easier to 
communicate than tacit knowledge [52].  
 2.3.3. Organizational memory 
Improving learning from incidents within an organization means improving the 
organizational memory. Past incidents acquired by individuals become the source of 
knowledge and is then analyzed, stored, and retrieved as a form of experience gained by 
the organization as a whole. Improving the organizational memory of an organization 
can increase productivity, decrease costs, and generally improve the know-how of the 
organization due to accumulation of knowledge, implementation of new ideas, and 
correction of errors, and consequently, lead to improve decision-making within the 
organization. 
Organizational memory is defined as the knowledge from the past that is exerted 
upon present organizational tasks and routines [41, 53]. Likewise, organizational 
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memory is seen as the stored knowledge that an organization possesses [41]. This 
concept has been evolving over the years, changing the approach and techniques applied 
to gain and retain knowledge within the organization. The main change resides in the 
evolution from individual memory to a corporate memory, with respect of the place 
where the knowledge is stored. Nowadays, the objective is to enhance the mechanisms in 
which knowledge is stored so it can be easily extracted through the years and 
organizations do not have to rely only on individuals to maintain knowledge. These 
mechanisms of storing are employees, organization’s culture, procedures and routines, 
the management system, and the physical structure of the workplace [41]. The 
combination of all of these mechanisms, ensure that organizations implement the 
knowledge and make it part of the daily activities in the organization.  
As Walsh and Ungson states, the organizational memory process involves three 
stages: acquisition, retention, and retrieval [54]. The acquisition occurs when new 
information is gained based on decisions and the evaluation of the consequences of those 
decisions. The accumulation of information based on past decisions refers to the 
organizational memory that is acquired by the organization [54]. Then, the information 
is retained by the different storing mechanisms that the organization possesses, in order 
to disseminate and implement the information across the organization. Finally, 
organizations have to ensure that information can be retrieved as required. Thus, 
employees can access the stored knowledge throughout the whole organization. 
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2.3.4. Organizational forgetting 
Do organizations retain all the knowledge they get over the years? Does 
knowledge change over time? Since employees leave, the technologies and best 
practices change, and all the information cannot be retained. It is important that 
organizations take into account the depreciation of knowledge over time and the amount 
of knowledge that is forgotten by the organization once employees are no longer part of 
it or whenever a new process is implemented.  
Organizational forgetting is the intentional or unintentional loss of knowledge at 
any level within an organization [55]. The intentional forgetting refers to process by 
which individuals discard obsolete knowledge in order to receive updated or new 
knowledge. By doing that, organizations are able to adapt to new changes in the 
environment. Intentional forgetting is also called as unlearning process. Conversely, the 
unintentional forgetting refers to the degradation of knowledge over time, due to lack of 
storing mechanisms within the organization. Studies suggests that organizational 
forgetting can be seen as positive and negative as the same time, considering unlearning 
as the process that helps organizations to adapt and stay competitive in the market. In 
contrast, it can be seen as negative when forgetting occurs with no reason and prevents 
organizations to remember what need to be done to avoid the same mistakes [33, 55].  
 
2.4. Barriers of organizational learning 
The learning process becomes more complex for organization than for individual 
due to a number of internal and external difficulties that inhibit organizations to learn 
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appropriately. Consequently, organizations have to focus their attention not only in the 
elements that affect individual learning. They also have to understand the complexity of 
learning interactions among individuals and the external elements that limit the learning 
process. This research has been focusing in the understanding of eight barriers that 
prevent or reduce the learning outcome:      
 Ambiguity about incident causation: refers to the tendency of the top management 
level to select one interpretation instead of another. That means, that a leader is 
going to choose to learn only from what it is familiar to him, and is aligned with 
their preconceptions, actions, and goals [56] . This type of barrier, limited the 
amount of lessons learned that are going to be communicated and implemented 
within the organizations. Likewise, in some cases, this type of barrier can lead 
organizations to interpret lessons learned incorrectly. 
 Political environments: refers to the limitations experienced by organizations once 
an incident occurred. In which, the quality of the recommendations are going to 
exposes the self-interests of some people. In this sense, the recommendations are 
going to blame someone instead of pointing out failures in the management system 
and consequently in the top-level management [56]. Moreover, political 
environments restrict the amount of information that is communicated through the 
organization and among them. In such politicized environments, learning is 
reduced to a limited amount and low quality of lessons learned and partial learning 
within the organization.  
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 Competitive organizations: refers to the restrictions and limited knowledge that is 
shared between and within the organizations. Learning is limited to the knowledge 
and experience that is created inside the facility or organization.  People from one 
facility may not know what another facility is doing in terms of safety in order to 
prevent the same mistakes. Competitive organizations are one the major barrier 
that the chemical and oil and gas industry is facing nowadays. Sharing lessons 
learned is restricted by lawyers inside and outside organizations, due the expose of 
sensitive information that can reveal the know-how of organization. The chemical 
and oil and gas industry needs to learn from industries such nuclear and aviation, in 
which the information is shared among the whole industry to improve together and 
prevent future incidents [56]. 
 Lack of leadership: the role of leadership is key for organizations in order to learn 
and have an open environment that helps employees to raise their concerns and 
suggestions about how things are running. Leaders need to be involved in the 
learning process, to motivate and support people throughout the process and give 
them the required resources to achieve the expected outcome. Thus, leaders are 
responsible for giving employees the spaces to learn and high quality resources to 
get the appropriate knowledge. Additionally, leaders have to be shown as an 
example, being committed to their own learning process [57]. 
 Unlearning process: unlearning refers to process in which individuals discard 
obsolete knowledge in order to receive updated or new knowledge [33]. This 
process requires a high degree of reflection and understanding of what need to be 
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changed, making this process challenging for organizations because some people 
are resistant to changes, act on the defensive, and have their own prejudices. 
Therefore, organizations have to be creative, intuitive, and patients to face this 
process [57]. 
 Organizational culture: working in the culture of the organization is a continuous 
journey in which all employees need to be engaged with the organization and they 
have to believe the values and goals of the organization. A good organizational 
culture allows companies to build trust among employees, motivate them to receive 
knowledge from others and learn individually, in groups and in organizational 
level. Furthermore, it helps organizations to be open to changes, innovation and 
admission of mistakes when required. Finally, it increases near miss reporting, 
since a culture of no blame is encouraged [50]. 
 Inadequate communication: refers to the different communication channels that an 
organization has and how much of their knowledge they are willing to share. This 
also applies to the internal communication between departments and facilities. If an 
organization is open to communicate and share their previous experiences and 
knowledge, they can also receive knowledge from others and therefore, avoid the 
same mistakes. Likewise, organizations have to ensure open spaces in which the 
internal knowledge can be transferred from one facility to another. Finally, leaders 
have to ensure an open environment in which employees feel free to communicate 
with them to provide suggestions and receive feedback from their job.  
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 Short-term focus: refers to the tendency of some organizations to focus their effort 
in solving short-term problems instead of looking at the big picture. Most of the 
recommendations from incidents tend to focus just in the intermediary causes. 
Thus, the management system failures remain hidden and the real problems are not 
analyzed. This happens because root causes require more time to be identified and 
addressed, and it requires a higher level of commitment for the top management 
level.  Similarly, this type of barrier refers to the tendency to focus in the single-
loop learning in which only actions are modified but no analysis of the root causes 
is performed. 
 
2.5. Learning methods 
Knowledge is delivered to employees in form of training, which can vary 
depending of the depth, frequency, and level of detailed of the task that need to be 
learned. Edgar Dale developed the model “Cone of Experience”, which refers to the 
different levels of abstraction to concrete experiences [58]. The model is explained with 
a pyramid, showing in the top of the pyramid, the lowest level of abstraction: words. 
Conversely, the bottom of the pyramid is showing the higher level of abstraction: real 
life experiences [58]. Based on this model a whole new theory was developed in order to 
explain the levels of retention with respect on the learning method that is applied. 
Consequently, the pyramid was adapted and percentages were incorporated to show the 
amount of knowledge that can be retained by an individuals depending on how this 
information is presented [59]. Some researches claim that this new “learning pyramid” 
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lacks of evidence and proper validation with respect of the percentages that are shown 
[58]. However, the learning pyramid can be seen as a guideline in order to understand 
the different levels of retention, instead of a quantitated fact of individual retention. This 
means, that teachers and organizations can guide their methods considering this 
approach. But, they have also take into account the required background to perform each 
method, the expected outcome, and the limitations of the target that is going to be taught. 
Figure 4. presents the different average rates of retention developed by the National 
Training Laboratory [60]. The pyramid can be divided into two levels: passive and 
participatory teaching methods. Passive teaching methods refers to the different 
techniques in which the individual is not participating or is not playing an active role 
during the session, such as lectures, reading, audio-visual, and demonstrations. 
Conversely, participatory teaching methods refers to the techniques in which the 
individual plays an active role and is involved during the session, such as group 
discussions, practices, and teaching others [60]. Similarly, passive and participatory 
concepts can be described as cognitive and behavioral methods respectively.  
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Figure 4 Training methods, adapted from [27] 
 
Based on the pyramid, people can conclude that learning should be focusing just 
in the bottom of the pyramid and forget the traditional ways of learning such as lectures 
and reading. However, each method offers specific benefits that cannot be achieved only 
by focusing on the bottom of the pyramid. Thus, organizations have to provide training 
using a combination of two or more methods, in order to ensure that the knowledge is 
transferred. Likewise, organizations have to balance the cost-benefit associated with 
each technique and the appropriate scenarios to use them.   
The cognitive approach is associated with transformation or addition of 
knowledge, by generating relationships among the existing and new knowledge [61]. 
Therefore, these types of techniques are focusing in teaching the rules of how to do 
something and providing the basic concepts and theories behind that [62]. In contrast, 
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the behavioral approach is associated with skill development (learn by doing) and a 
change in behavior [61]. This type of technique focuses on providing practical training 
and allows participants to behave and think how they would act in real life. Generally, 
training objectives intend to achieve learning in knowledge, skills and attitudes. None of 
those techniques can achieve all three objectives at the same time. For that reason, 
training has to combine more than one method to perform a successful training program 
[63].  
The advantages and disadvantages of each method of the learning pyramid are 
described below:  
 Lecture method: is designed to develop an understating about a specific topic. The 
objective is to enhance theoretical knowledge through oral presentation. The 
interaction between trainer and trainee is limited to the questions and answers that 
can be raised during the presentation. Commonly, a lecture consists of an 
introduction, body of the lecture, conclusions, and a summary. This type of method 
is useful when you need to reach a large number of people. Moreover, lectures are 
less expensive than others techniques and serves as a basis for other techniques 
[63]. However, trainer should take into account the right balance between the 
amount of material to be taught and the period of time they have, due to the 
decreased effectiveness in retention [64]. 
 Reading method: is designed as a self-study technique, which basically, has the 
same objectives as lecture method, but there is no interaction between trainer and 
trainee. This type of technique allows trainees go back and check the material as 
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many times as they need [65]. Commonly, reading method is used in organizations 
to disseminate general knowledge regarding a specific topic, such as lessons 
learned and best practices. 
 Audio-visual method: is designed to give trainees training through audio and visual 
at the same time. Therefore, trainees can be more focused in what is being taught 
[65]. This type of technique allows reaching large amount of people at the same 
time. Moreover, audio-visual methods allow participants to learn by watching how 
to do certain task and therefore, try to imitate what they see. Audio-visual 
techniques such as videos are widely used in organizations to show past incidents 
and their lessons learned.  Videos have shown to improve quality of training 
because of the advantages that they offered, such as flexibility in the speed they 
want to learn, they can see events that are not easy to demonstrate, gives them 
consistent instructions about the topic, and an objective feedback [63]. 
 Demonstration method: is designed to show how to do something in order to teach 
skills. The demonstration technique allows trainers to show the step-by-step of a 
job task and the importance of each step involved in the process [63]. Moreover, 
demonstrations are useful to make the training more meaningful and realistic. 
Commonly, demonstration technique consists of a description of the main 
objectives, practical demonstration, summary of the key learning points, and in 
some cases the trainer allows the trainees to perform the same task, followed by 
questions and discussion [66]. This type of method is usually applied to teach how 
to follow a specific procedure [63]. 
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 Group discussion: is designed to allow trainees to share their opinions and 
experiences about a certain topic. The objective of this technique is to improve 
analytical skills, logical reasoning, and problem solving. Additionally, it helps 
trainees to improve communications skills. Some of the most common types of 
group discussion methods are case study and role-play [66]. Case study is designed 
to apply theoretical concepts in applied context. The main objective is to give 
trainees a detailed description of a situation, where an organization deals with a 
difficult situation, and they have to analyze and identify the main causes of the 
event and suggest recommendations. This type of technique aims to improve 
analysis, synthesis and evaluation skills [63].  Similarly, in the role-play technique, 
trainees have to perform a character for a specific situation that recreates real life. 
The objective is to compare the performance with real life conditions and improve 
problem solving skills and the identification of them [66].  
 Practice: refers to the type of training in which the trainee has the opportunity to 
get fully involved in the activity that is being taught. Thus, the trainees are 
expected to carry out the activity and demonstrate that they are able to do it 
correctly. Usually, a complete training program ends with some practical training 
in which the trainee is expected to develop specific skills regarding a specific job. 
Moreover, the trainee is able to experience how the learned skills and behaviors are 
transferred to the job, and how to deal with daily issues that arise during the job 
[63]. Some of the most common techniques for practical training are Job 
Instructional Technique (JIT) and simulators. Job instructional technique consists 
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of an explanation of the task, instructional plan, a demonstration, try out, and 
follow up. In this method, the trainee has to be able to explain how to perform the 
task before the execution of it. Similarly, simulators are used to imitate real life 
situations. This type of technique is widely used in the military and aerospace 
industry.  
 Teaching others: the ultimate level of retention refers to teaching others, which 
refers to level of understanding that you have to achieved in order to be able to 
teach others. Once internalize a concept, they should be able to explain it to 
someone else. 
 
2.6. Factors that influence learning 
The learning process can be affected for several factors that can lead to 
unsuccessful learning outcomes. Those factors can be represented as physical and mental 
process that occurred in an individual level at the same time they are getting trained. 
Likewise, the different strategies implemented to transfer knowledge and the level of 
understanding of the target can also influence learning.  
First, a well-established training program has to take into account the 
characteristics of the "adult learning" and the appropriate approach to reach them. Thus, 
the training program should considers the following aspects:  
 Trainees need to know why they should learn: they have to understand the 
objective and why that is important [61]. 
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 Meaningful training: they are more willing to learn when the information is linked 
to their job experiences [61]. 
 Opportunities to practice: they need spaces to rehearse and show the learned 
capability [61]. 
 Commit training to memory: they need to move the information from the short-
term memory to the long-term memory. That means they need to receive detail 
information and determine that it is important [61].  
 Feedback: they need to receive feedback regarding how well they are meeting the 
objectives and how to fill the current gaps [61]. 
 Spacing: teaching in various sessions instead of teaching all the material in short 
period of time, will increase the long-term memory [67].  
 Test: testing increases learning and helps trainees to increase their long-term 
memory [67]. 
 
Second, the age of the trainees has shown influence on the learning process as 
certain mental capacities decrease over time. However, ages come with experience. 
Thus, in some cases experience can compensate age. Third, the mental precondition that 
the trainee brings to the training. This refers to the motivation and basic skills of the 
trainee. Fourth, the perception that the trainee gets from the information that he is 
receiving. This refers to the ability to organize and processed the information. Fifth, the 
ability of the trainee to convey new information with the existing knowledge and uses 
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the information to influence behaviors. Finally, the ability of the trainee to adapts the 
new knowledge to new situations [68-70]. 
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3. INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Incident investigation is one of the most powerful practices to learn from 
experience within an organization. This process allows organizations to receive feedback 
about their behavior and operational practices, in order to identify flaws in the system 
and overcome the deficiencies to prevent similar incidents and avoid catastrophes. High 
hazardous industries, such as, nuclear and chemical industries are more vulnerable to 
experience “organizational accidents” as called by James Reason [71]. These types of 
incidents are a combination of multiple failures that take place in complex systems. Even 
if this type of incidents has very low probability of occurrence, once it happens it is often 
catastrophic with devastating consequences that can involve people, infrastructure, and 
environment [71]. Thus, organizations have to focus their attention on improving the 
incident investigation program to detect latent failures that can lead to this type of 
disasters and implement risk-reducing measures to prevent them.  
Incident investigation is defined as the systematic approach for determining the 
causes of an incident and the corresponding recommendations that may prevent or 
mitigate future incidents [72]. Moreover, this process helps organizations to identify 
failures in the management system that can reduce the risk of having another incident 
with similar root causes at the same facility or other facilities within the organization 
[72]. 
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The classical Accident Causation theory or  “Swiss Cheese Model” developed by 
Reason in 1997 makes a clear representation of the dynamics and path for an incident to 
happen [71, 73]. The theory suggested how high-consequence incidents could occur 
once latent and active failures are aligned, as depicted graphically in Figure 5. Latent 
failures refer to deficiencies or flaws associated with organizational factors, supervision 
or preconditions for unsafe acts. While, active failures refer to unsafe acts that act as the 
triggering event [73, 74]. 
 
 
Figure 5 Swiss Cheese model, adapted from [71] 
 
The interaction between latent and active failures that lead to a catastrophic 
incident is hard to detect and understand, due to the complexity and limited number of 
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such incidents. Thus, learning from high consequences incidents limited the amount of 
knowledge that need to be learned and only shows partial reality of the organization. 
Research has shown that in order to unhide latent failures, it is necessary to investigate 
all type of incidents that have significance and therefore, help to prevent disasters [75].  
 
 
Figure 6 Safety pyramid, adapted from [75] 
 
H.W. Heinrich was the first person to introduce the safety pyramid in his book 
Industrial Accident Prevention in 1931. The safety pyramid refers to the ratio of the 
number of minor incidents and near misses that occur before a major incident takes place 
[76]. The pyramid has been validated and slightly modified by Frank E. Bird Jr. in 1996 
and later on by ConocoPhillips Marine in 2003 [75]. The study made by ConocoPhillips 
Marine suggests that for one fatality incident, an organization has 30 severe incidents, 
300 minor incidents, 3,000 near misses, and 300,000 at-risk behaviors or unsafe acts 
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[75]. As a result, organizations has to focus their attention to the bottom of the pyramid, 
where they can identify trends and find useful information to take the necessary 
preventive actions and improve safety management systems. Figure 6. Presents a graphic 
description of the safety pyramid.  
 
3.2. Incident investigation terminology 
The safety pyramid provides a general understanding of the different types of 
incidents that an organization can experience depending of the severity of them. There is 
not general agreement regarding incident classification. Even so, organizations recognize 
the importance of classifying the nature of the incident in order to determine the 
appropriate approach to investigate them [77]. Therefore, based on literature and 
previous experience, a general description and classification is provided below: 
 Incident: a work-related unplanned event, which has or may have undesirable 
consequence, such as harm to people, damage infrastructure or the environment [72, 
78]. The definition of incident and accident are commonly mixed and used for the 
same purpose. However, the definitions differ with respect of the capability to be 
prevented or not. In this sense, it implies that an incident could be prevented if 
something had been done differently.  
 Catastrophic incident: work-related incident, which has major consequences usually 
involving fatalities, severe off-site environmental impact, and/or severe community 
impact [77]. Some examples of catastrophic incidents are Bhopal in 1984 and 
Macondo Blowout and explosion in 2010.  
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 Severe and minor incident: this type of classification varies depending on the risk 
matrix applied in the company. Usually, a severe incident involves major injuries, 
major interruptions to operation, and/or evacuation of personal. Conversely, minor 
incidents usually refer to incidents that have no major consequences to people, 
infrastructure or the environment.  
 Near miss: in terms of process safety, near miss is defined by the Mary Kay 
O’Connor Process Safety Center as the event in which the loss of containment is 
prevented by the last layer of protection in the process [79]. Likewise, near misses 
refer to events with no undesirable consequences, but any changes in the 
circumstances could have produced actual consequences [80].  
The terminology used in incident investigations has been challenging over the 
years because there is not a general understanding among the concepts and the 
methodologies applied by organizations. As a result, organizations fail to understand the 
difference among concepts such as root causes, contributing factors, and direct causes 
and the importance to recognized and identifies each of them in order to develop 
effective investigations and prevent incidents to happen again.  For the purpose of this 
research those concepts are defined as follow:  
 Causal factor: an event or condition necessary to produce or contribute to the 
incident [81], i.e., that if eliminated would have prevented the incident or reduced 
the consequences of it [72]. Causal factors can be classified into root cause, 
contributing factor, and direct cause [81]. 
 Direct cause: refers to the immediate events that lead to the incident [82]. 
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 Root cause: refers to the underlying causes and the most basic causes of an 
incident, that if removed, the incident would not have happened. Root causes are 
associated with failures in the management system, which can be categorized into 
failures in the system design or failures in system implementation [79]. 
 Contributing factor: “factors that facilitate the occurrence of an incident such as 
physical conditions and management practices” [72]. 
The level of detail of each incident investigation varies from company to 
company but it is usually associated with the severity of the incident. Thus, high 
potential incidents such as near misses with high significance could be excluded for 
detailed analysis and the company may lose valuable findings that can lead to the 
identification of failures in the management system. For that reason, companies should 
take into account variables such as the nature, complexity, and the actual or potential 
severity of the incident, in order to determine the appropriate team and the level of 
analysis required for each incident [77]. 
It should be noted that although not all incidents will be investigated in detail or 
investigated at all, they have to be reported and recorded in an internal database to 
identify trends and keep track of all incidents within the organization. In this context, 
organizations should investigate the following incidents [79]: 
 Catastrophic and major incidents. 
 Minor incidents with significance, i.e., incidents with high potential consequences. 
 Near misses with significance, i.e., incidents in which the outcome could have been 
serious if the circumstances were slightly different [79]. 
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 Minor recurring incidents or recurring near misses identified by trend analysis.  
 
3.3. Incident investigation history 
Although, incident investigation theory has been changing over the years and 
new methodologies have been developed to address the complexity of new systems and 
technologies in the industry. Incident investigation still conserves most of the basis and 
assumptions developed in the earliest accident causation theories. Herbert W. Heinrich is 
considered the pioneered of accident causation theory, introducing the domino theory of 
accident causation back in 1931 [82]. The domino theory described the occurrence of an 
incident based on the culmination of a series of events, which occur in a logical 
sequence. Thus, an incident (called by the author as accident) can be prevented if the 
series of events are disturbed [84]. The events are defined as dominos and are classified 
into five categories: social environment and ancestry, fault of the person, unsafe act or 
condition, incident, and injury. The theory is lined with the assumptions of incidents 
prevention: focusing in people, which are responsible of the incidents and management, 
where the incident can be prevented [82]. Moreover, Heinrich developed and set the 
basis of the safety pyramid and created a general understanding about the importance of 
accident theory.  
The work done by Herbert W. Heinrich sets the starting point for the accident 
causation theory, which over the years has evolved based on the level of complexity that 
arises for an incident to occur. In this sense, the accident causation field has been divided 
into three main ways of thinking. These three categories are: simple linear or sequential 
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model, complex linear or epidemiological model, and complex nonlinear model. Those 
types of theories have been focused in the identification of single causes, multiple 
causes, and complex outcomes, respectively [83]. It should be noted that the 
combination of those theories and level of understanding of each way of thinking have 
shaped our current understanding about incident investigation and risk analysis. 
Simple linear model refers to Heinrich domino accident causation theory 
explained previously, in which an accident can be prevented by eliminating or disturbing 
one of the factors or dominos [83]. Similarly, Bird and Germain developed the Loss 
Causation Model in 1985, in which a modified domino theory was established by the 
incorporation of management factors in order to explain their relationship with the 
causes and consequences of an incident [84].  
Conversely, complex linear models focused in the identification and elimination 
of root causes and the identification of the required barriers or controls in order to 
prevent incidents. Moreover, these theories incorporated the interactions between the 
individual and the system leading to unsafe conditions. Complex linear models can be 
explained by a combination of theories such as energy damage theory, time sequence 
model, epidemiological model, and systemic theories [85]. Complex linear theory is 
highly recognized by the work done by James Reason [74] and Jens Rasmussen [57, 86], 
which have had a significant impact in accident causation theory. Those theories are 
based on a system-oriented approach and were able to change the perspective from the 
traditional human error approach to a systematic organizational approach [84].  
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Finally, complex non-linear models refer to the new tendency of thinking, in 
which the non-linear incident causation is recognized. Thus, incidents are the result of a 
combination of mutually interacting variables involved in complex environments. This 
generation of thinking highlights the research done by Hollnagel and Leveson. Both of 
them are recognized by the development of non-linear accident models in the 2000s 
[78]. The models are: The Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) 
developed by Leveson and The Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) 
developed by Hollnagel [83]. STAMP model considers systems in dynamic equilibrium 
and analyzes the dysfunctional interactions among components that are part of the 
system. Moreover, the model classified the different types of flaws that can lead to an 
incident and analyzes the role of constraints in safety management systems [87]. 
Alternatively, FRAM model considers that system alterations lead to incidents when the 
system cannot hold up such alterations. Thus, the model identified the different variables 
within an organization and how to manage those alterations that can arise in order to 
produce an incident [88].  
These three generations of thinking, overlap over the years and combine theories 
and models in order to suggest better approaches to understand real systems behaviors 
[83]. Meanwhile, a considerable amount of methods have been developed for incident 
investigation and those methods have been focused in the identification of root causes. 
An older methodology, The Management Oversight and risk Tree – MORT, developed 
by Johnson in 1973, provides a detail and comprehensive understanding for root causes 
identification [89]. However, their application has been limited due to their complexity 
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and the required time to executed it. Even so, later methodologies have been developed 
based on MORT methodology. Nowadays, organizations have spent significant amount 
of resources in the development of computerized methodologies, which reduces time and 
helps standardizing the process [90].  
3.4. Incident investigation team 
The incident investigation team is a critical element for the development of 
successful incident investigations processes, because their expertise and teamwork will 
shape the quality of the recommendations and the degree of analysis of the identified 
causes. Usually, the top management along with the safety department are in charge of 
selecting the incident investigation team based on the severity and the nature of the 
incident [80]. The team is selected based on their experience, skills, and competencies 
associated to the process, where the incident occurred, as well as, the competencies and 
skills related with incident investigation methodologies. Since organizations usually are 
in charge of multiple types of processes and products, it is not practical to have only one 
team trained to perform incident investigations. Thus, organizations should have a pool 
of trained employees across the company, who will be familiar with incident 
investigation process and the methodologies that need to be applied [77].  The team 
composition will vary depending of the specific required knowledge for the 
investigation. Generally, an investigation team is composed but not limit to [77, 79, 80]:  
 Leader trained in incident investigations 
 Process operators, who will bring expertise of the process where the event 
happened  
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  Process engineers and process safety specialists 
 Maintenance and technical specialists  
 Contractors representatives  
 Law representatives 
 Potential involvement of third parties depending of the nature of the incident.  
In order to bring the objectivity to the investigation, it is a common practice to 
involve employees from sister units or plants, who are familiar with the process and can 
provide the necessary technical expertise in the investigation. Likewise, it is also a 
common practice to include someone, who can help during the investigation with 
specific technical inquiries [80]. Furthermore, some organizations try to avoid including 
managers or people from the top level management to the team, because it can inhibit an 
open communication within the members of the team [77]. Finally, it is also a common 
practice to provide training to the team prior the investigation to provide an appropriate 
background about the incident, required personal protective equipment, emergency 
response, and incident investigation methodology that is going to be applied [80]. 
It should be noticed that the responsibilities assigned to the team are temporary 
and required their full time in order to gather and analyze the information. Therefore, it 
is important that managers understand their role and the temporary suspension of their 
routine responsibilities [77, 80]. 
After the team has been selected the team members will have to go through the 
whole incident investigation process, since gathering the information until the 
development of the recommendations. One of the most challenging steps is the 
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identification and collection of evidence. Since, evidences can be easily disturbed and 
manipulated by external sources. Moreover, based on the nature of the incident, there 
may be more than one team investigating the incident, making even harder to perform 
the job. Thus, the team has to act fast but at the same time be careful identifying 
potential hazards to the team, trying to look the big picture of the scene, noting what is 
missing and what is there that should not be there, and using all senses to get as much 
evidence as possible. At the same time, they have to develop a list of preliminary 
potential scenarios, which are going to be the main source for identifying the required 
evidence and factors that contribute to the incident [80]. 
 
3.5 Incident investigation process 
Once an incident occurs, the incident must be reported and classified 
accordingly, in order to arrange the required resources and determine the best strategies 
to approach the following investigation. This section addresses the different phases or 
steps required to perform incident investigations, since the reporting of the incident until 
developing and implementation of the recommendations [91]. 
To ensure a successful incident investigation, organizations have to ensure that a 
proper incident investigation management system has been developed and implemented. 
The incident investigation management system sets the basis and criteria of how an 
incident is going to be handled and the procedures that need to be followed during this 
process [72]. A common management system needs to consider at least but no limited to 
the following elements [72, 85]: 
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 Organization’s responsibilities 
 Roles, relationships, and communication with others teams and departments 
 Regulatory issues and their role 
 Incident classification criteria 
 Team composition 
 Required documentation 
 Incident investigation methodologies 
 Required training 
 Reports 
 Resources  
 Incident investigation procedures 
 Interview forms 
3.5.1. Reporting 
The incident investigation management system should encourage and create a 
reporting culture, where the employees feel confidents to report unsafe behaviors, near 
misses and minor incidents. Likewise, a culture of no blame will allow employees to talk 
and report without fear of potential consequences. Reporting must be made as quickly as 
possible, in order to provide immediate response and preserve the evidence without 
external alterations. There are two types of reporting to be taken into account once the 
incident occurred. The first one is the internal reporting, which refers to reporting from 
employees to the incident investigation management system and also the corresponding 
report within the organization, to alert the departments and people that need to be 
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informed about the event. This type of reporting can be via paper, online or verbal. The 
second type of reporting, depends of the severity of the incident, in which external 
entities such as regulators and firefighters must be informed about the incident [91]. 
After the incident has been reported, the next step is to classify it, record it, and 
determine how it is going to be approached. Then, the incident investigation team must 
be selected to execute the investigation.  
3.5.2. Collecting evidence  
Gathering evidence is one of the most challenging and time consuming stages 
during incident investigations, because in some cases, evidence is damaged, 
documentation is not available or it is difficult to access, and witnesses may have 
conflicting versions of what happened. Therefore, preserving and verifying evidence 
requires experience and a rigorous plan that must be followed [81]. In this step, it is 
important that prior to start collecting data, the team leader and team members available 
at that time, develop a plan, which will guide the evidence collection. It is likely that the 
plan is going to change as the investigation progresses [72].  
The evidence or data can be classified into three types: human, physical or 
documentary. Human evidence refers to witness statements or interviews, as well as 
observations. Physical evidence refers to any physical source relevant to the incident 
such as equipment, mechanical parts or chemicals. Documentary evidence refers to the 
paper and electronic documentation, such as procedures, logs and reports [81]. 
Besides the information that can be collected inside the organization, there may be 
additional sources that will support the investigation. Some of these of sources are: 
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equipment manufacturers, universities research centers, external databases, government 
records, and companies with similar processes. As a result, not all evidence is collected 
during the site visit, there may be data or information that will result from additional 
analysis such as laboratory experiments, testing or external interviews [72]. 
The severity of the incident will determine how easily and quickly the incident 
investigation team will have access to the evidence. In the case of major process safety 
incidents, there may be external entities in place such as OSHA, EPA or insurance 
companies that will limit the access to the site and the availability of information. At the 
same time, the physical damaged of the site can affect the collection of data, and most of 
the witness will be unavailable at the moment [72]. 
3.5.3. Analyzing the evidence  
An objective investigation must consider all realistic scenarios that possibly lead 
to an incident. Then, based on the collected evidence, each scenario will be tested and 
consequently will be rejected or accepted. All scenarios must be documented and 
reevaluated accordingly if new evidence is gathered [80]. The objective of this stage is to 
identify the direct causes, root causes, and contributing factors in the incident, in order to 
be able to answer the questions of what happened and why did it happen [81]. As 
established in the incident investigation management system, a predefined methodology 
is going to be applied to identify the root causes of the incident. Generally, root cause 
methodologies start by identifying a timeline or sequence diagram, which set a basic 
understanding of the incident, main events, and conditions [72]. The next steps vary 
depending of the methodology that is going to be used. Some of the most relevant 
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methodologies for analysis of evidence and identification of root causes are further 
discussed in next section. 
3.5.4. Developing recommendations  
The final outcome of incident investigations is the recommendation that are 
generated based on the root causes and contributing factors identified through the 
investigation. During this process, each cause has to be analyzed individually and a 
proposed action or recommendation should arise from this analysis. The 
recommendations have to be clearly defined, measurable and feasible. Likewise, the 
objective and risk reduction action should be easily understood. Since the 
recommendations will impact the management system of the organization, it is important 
that recommendations go through a management of change evaluation before they are 
approved [72]. Moreover, it is also a common practice that the recommendations are 
risk-ranked to determine priority for implementation along with a cost-benefit analysis in 
order to determine the feasibility of the recommendations. All recommendations need to 
be evaluated and approved by the management and depending of the nature of the 
incident, the legal department may need to review and approve the recommendations as 
well. Once the recommendations are approved, the people in charge of the execution of 
each recommendation are assigned and a timeline is defined. Finally, the management 
system is responsible for tracking the implementation status of those recommendations 
as well as document the resolution of each recommendation. Only until the 
recommendations are implemented, organizations are reducing the risk and consequently 
learning from incidents [80]. 
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3.5.5. Report and lessons learned 
The final stage of the incident investigation process involved the development of 
a written report, which contains all documentation involved during the process. The 
report covers all the detailed information used during the investigation, since evidence, 
causes until recommendations. Generally, an incident report format includes at least the 
following elements: summary, background, description of the incident, root causes, 
recommendations, and appendix. Finally, the lessons learned are expected to be 
communicated with all interested parties in order to ensured learning across the industry 
[80].  
 
3.6 Incident investigation methodologies 
3.6.1. Fault tree analysis 
Fault tree analysis is a graphic methodology, whose objective is to identify 
“why” an incident happened [72]. The methodology uses logical reasoning to determine 
the possible combinations or pathways that lead to an incident. Those combinations can 
be associated with equipment or component failures, human factors, or organizational 
factors [92]. Fault tree analysis uses starting point as the top event, which refers to the 
outcome of the incident. Then, the process consists of going backwards in order to 
identify the preceding causes or events, until the root causes are finally identified. The 
level of detail of this technique will depend of the incident investigation team. A FTA 
can be used as a qualitative method, quantitative method or both [81]. The methodology 
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uses symbols to guide readers to understand the different pathways and logic of the 
diagram. Figure 7. Present the most relevant symbols for developing fault trees.  
 
 
Figure 7 FTA symbols, adapted from [77] 
 
The symbols AND and OR represent the gates that connect one event to one or 
multiple events. The gate AND indicates that the outcome event occurs only if all the 
input events occur. Conversely, the gate OR indicates that one or more input events have 
to occur to produce the outcome event [72]. Figure 8. shows a basic representation of a 
FTA.  
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Figure 8 Basic representation of a FTA, adapted from [81] 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
3.6.2. STEP (Sequential Timed Events Plotting) 
Sequential timed events plotting is a systematic methodology for incident 
investigation (accident investigation as called by the author) developed by Hendrick and 
Benner (1987) [93]. STEP is a multi-linear event sequence, which provides a detailed 
description of the incident process. The methodology focuses in the identification of the 
authors and the sequence of events or actions that lead to the incident. Thus, STEP 
considers that multiple actions can take place at the same time by different authors. The 
authors are considered as people or things directly involved in the incident [93]. 
 The incident need to be analyzed looking for the big picture and then breaking 
down into actors and actions. In order to accomplish that Hendrick ad Benner introduced 
the term “making mental movies”, which refers to the visualization of each action 
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executed by each actor from the time the incident was expected to began, until the top 
event of the incident.  The methodology process is supported by a STEP worksheet, 
which helps to visualize and link all the events together. The STEP worksheet is 
described as a matrix, in which the authors are identified in the rows and the events in 
the columns, as shown in Figure 9. To ensure logical sequence, the events are linked by 
arrows that represent the flow of the incident [93]. 
 
 
Figure 9 Basic STEP diagram, adapted from [93]  
 
After the diagram is completed, the incident investigation result is subject to 
three different types of tests: row test, column test, and necessary and sufficient test. The 
row test verifies that the actions and authors are broken down sufficiently. The column 
test verifies that the sequence of events is consistent and coherent. Finally, the necessary 
and sufficient test verifies that the previous event is sufficient to produce the outcome 
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event [82]. The STEP worksheet is then analyzed in order to identify the event or events 
that generate safety problems. Each safety problem is then analyzed as candidate for 
recommendation [82]. 
3.6.3. FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis Method) 
Functional resonance analysis method provides a socio-technical approach in 
order to analyze and understand the functions of the system. The objective of the method 
is to determine what should have happened that did not happen. To do that, FRAM 
analyzes the potential variability and functional resonance in the system [94]. FRAM is 
based on the development of four steps:  
First, the identification of daily functions required in the system. Functions refer 
to the activities required to produce a specific outcome. Thus, the first step required to 
determine all possible functions involved in the system as well as the identification of 
the attributes of each function. The attributes refer to the characterization of the 
functions, which are described into six aspects as shown in Figure 10 [94].   
 
 
Figure 10 FRAM Function diagram, adapted from [94] 
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Second, the characterization of the variability of each function. This 
characterization is based on eleven Common Performance Conditions (CPCs). Those 
elements take into account human, technological, and organizational factors. The 
variability is determined considering both the potential and actual variability of the 
system [94].  Third, the identification of coupling functions and their interrelation in 
order to identify unexpected outcomes. This step requires to link all the identified 
functions and understand the potential variability that can be expected from that. Finally, 
the last step refers to the identification of barriers for variability and performance 
monitoring. Barriers can be divided into system and function barriers. System barriers 
refer to organizational aspects and physical barriers. Conversely, functions barriers refer 
to the way barriers can achieved their purpose. At the end, recommendations are going 
to be develop to enhance the identified barriers [94].   
3.6.4. Tripod BETA 
Tripod Beta is a systematic method to perform incident investigations. The 
method is based on the accident causation theory or Swiss Cheese Model. This 
methodology was formalized by Shell International and provides an understanding of the 
influences of human behavior and organizational factors in the system. Tripod theory 
focuses in the identification of environment conditions (organizational factors) in which 
humans work, rather than human conditions that lead to the incident. Thus, the ultimate 
goal is the identification of failures in the management system and organizational 
culture. Likewise, the methodology provides three main objectives: development of the 
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chain of events that lead to the incident, identification of the barriers that should have 
prevented the incident, and the identification of the underling or root causes [95]. 
The first step, is the development of a “core diagram”, which refers to the 
graphical representation of the events. The core diagram is developed based on the 
identification of Tripod Beta trios: Agent, object, and the event. Then, the trios are 
connected among them to provide a chain and sequence of events. The second step refers 
to the identification of the immediate causes that allowed barrier failing. The third step 
refers to the detailed understanding of why it happened. Thus, the preconditions and 
underling causes of the incident are identified. Finally, the previous steps are repeated 
until all the evidence is collected and analyzed [95]. 
In addition, Tripod Beta defined eleven mechanisms or Basic Risk Factors 
(BRFs) to categorize and guide the identification of underlying causes. Those BRFs are: 
design, tools and equipment, maintenance, housekeeping, error enforcing conditions, 
procedures, training, communication, incompatible goals, organizations, and defenses 
[82]. 
3.6.5. IPICA (Integrated Procedure of Incident Cause Analysis) 
Integrated procedure of incident analysis is a method for incident investigation 
based on the traditional Root Cause Analysis (RCA) method. The RCA is a complex 
linear method, whose goal is the identification of casual factors and root causes of an 
incident. The method mainly involved the following steps: development of incident 
sequence, identification of causal factors, development of causal factor chart, and the 
identification of root causes. The last step can be achieved by two different approaches: 
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using logic trees or using predefined trees. IPICA follows the second approach using 
predefined trees [96]. 
IPICA suggests an innovative approach, which addressed the limitations of RCA 
method identified by the author. The methodology is focused in the improvement on 
three main areas: assumptions of the nature of incident causes, limited definition of root 
causes and the methods applied for their identification and the complex non-linear effect 
in incidents. IPICA identifies four incident cause levels: implementation, organizational, 
management’s attitudes, and societal. The first level is considered as the direct causes of 
the incident, which are associated with the meta-components, i.e., interaction of 
hardware, software and personnel. The second level identifies failures in the 
management system and safety culture of the organization. In order to identify this, a 
root cause map is developed based on the CCPS guidelines to construct process safety 
management systems [72]. The third and fourth levels are required when the causal 
factors are associated with factors beyond the organizational boundaries. To identify 
those factors, the implementation of non-linear techniques such as STAMP or safety 
archetypes is needed [96]. 
3.6.6. TapRooT® System 
TapRooT® System combines a process and set of tools to investigate incidents 
and develop corrective actions. The system goes beyond the identification of the causes 
of the problem, instead the system supports investigators through the whole incident 
investigation process, since the collection of data, until the presentation of results and 
recommendations to the top management level and interested parties. TapRooT® is a 
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software, which uses and combines multiple techniques in order to achieve detailed and 
improved results [97]. 
The system consists in the execution of seven steps. The first step refers to the 
collection of the required information. The second step is the development of a sequence 
of events. In the third step the causal factors are identified. The second and third steps 
are supported by techniques such as SnapCharT® and Equifactor®. The fourth step 
refers to the identification of root causes, in which tools such as Root Cause Tree® and 
dictionary are used to help investigators in the identification of all the root causes. The 
root cause tree is divided into seven main categories and it is then break down into more 
detailed. The seven categories are: procedures, communication, work direction, training, 
management system, quality control, and human engineering. In addition, the root cause 
tree includes a set of fifteen questions to help investigators analyze human factors in 
more detail. Once the main root causes have been identified, the system guides the 
investigator in the identification of more complex causes such as culture, systemic, and 
organizational factors. The following steps refer to the analyzes of the root causes, 
development of recommendations, reporting and implementation those 
recommendations [98]. 
3.6.7. MORT (Management Oversight and Risk Tree) 
Management Oversight and Risk Tree is an incident investigation methodology 
developed by William Johnson. MORT consists of a predefined tree based on fault tree 
analysis methodology. The main objective of the methodology is to go through each 
branch in the tree and analyzes whether or not the associated causes are applicable to the 
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event. The branches end with the identification of failures in the management system 
[92]. Thus, the methodology uses a schematic representation of a dynamic and ideal 
management system model [89].  
The logic diagram identifies 98 generic problems and over 1500 basic causes or 
root causes associated with failures in the management system. The diagram starts with 
the top event followed by an OR gate, which derived the first important analyses that 
need to be done. The OR gate breaks down into two main branches: Management 
oversight and omissions or assumed risk. Assumed risk refers to the risks that have been 
analyzed and accepted by the management level. Conversely, unknown and unanalyzed 
risks are considered in management oversight and omissions. The next step requires to 
answer the questions ‘why’ and ‘what happened’. The ‘why’ refers to the management 
system factors, while the ‘what happened’ refers to the specific controls that should be in 
place [99].  
In order to perform the analyses, the diagram is supported with a manual that 
helps investigators to ask the right questions in each level of the analysis. Likewise, the 
methodology uses a color-coding system to help investigators visualize the progress and 
identify the areas that need additional information or analysis. The events that are not 
applicable to the incident should be colored in black. For the remaining events, a 
comprehensive evaluation needs to be done to understand if the event was adequate or 
not. If the event is considered Less Than Adequate (LTA), it should be colored in red. 
On the contrary, if the event is considered adequate, it is colored with green. In some 
cases, events can not be classified into those two categories because of lack of 
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information or uncertainty about this specific event. Those events are colored in blue and 
needs to be evaluated in more detail or more data need to be collected. The MORT 
analysis finished when all the blue events has been evaluated and consequently decided 
whether it is considered LTA or adequate [89, 99].   
3.6.8. STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes)  
Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes is an accident model based on 
system theory, developed by Nancy Leveson. STAMP describes accidents as inadequate 
control or enforcement of safety constraints in the system, instead of components 
failures. Thus, STAMP focuses in understanding why the control structure was 
inadequate and which feedback loops failed in the system. Likewise, STAMP considers 
safety as part of an adaptive socio-technical system, in which all the components are 
interrelated and are kept in a dynamic equilibrium [87].  
STAMP is based in the understanding and analysis of three basic concepts: 
constrains, control loops and process models, and levels of control. These concepts 
contextualize a classification of control flaws that help investigators to identify all 
factors involved in the incident [100]. First, accidents are conceived as the identification 
of constrains rather than events. Thus, STAMP identifies all the required constrains in 
the system, including the social and organizational factors and no just system design 
constraints. In addition, systems are conceived as hierarchical structures, in which each 
level imposes constraints to the lower level in order to control the system. In this sense, 
safety has two basic hierarchical levels of control: system development and system 
operation. Those levels of control must interact and develop effective channels of 
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communication. Each level in the control structure must define the different channels of 
enforcement and communication. Thus, each hierarchical level will impose constraints 
downward and will receive feedback upward to verify the effectiveness of those 
constraints. Finally, the concept of control loops and process models refers to the 
consistency that must be achieved between the model of the process used by the 
controllers (human or automated) and the actual process state. In this sense, the 
controllers are able to supervise the actual state of the system [87].  
STAMP developed a classification of flaws in the components of the system 
development and operations to support investigators in the analyses process. The 
classification is divided into three main branches: inadequate enforcement of constrains, 
inadequate execution of constrains and inadequate feedback. Each branch is then divided 
in more detail to identify al the factors involved in the incident [87].   
 
3.7. Developing quality incident investigation reports  
In incident investigations, all the effort and resources spent on it are going to 
shape the quality of the final product of the process: the incident investigation report. 
Therefore, identifying real root causes, developing quality recommendations, and 
making sure the recommendations are implemented are key elements to success in this 
process and reducing the risk in order to prevent similar incidents in the future. The 
incident investigation process allows organizations to analyze their system behavior and 
uncover hidden organizational, cultural, and technical flaws that are not visible in their 
day-to-day work. The process has to be performed with rigorousness, time, and making 
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sure the organization understands the importance and valuable output they can get from 
it. Otherwise, the process is going to be seen as a useless secondary work that needs to 
be done to comply. Having a good incident report and an overall good incident 
investigation program enables organizations to continually improve and over time 
ensuring a reliable process safety management system and high standard operational 
processes. In this sense, learning from incidents allows organizations to improve, be 
more competitive, and safe money. As Klezt stated, if organizations think safety is 
expensive, try an accident [14]. 
Quality incident investigation reports are the based on recommendations that are 
clearly defined and are intended to solve the identified causes on a feasible and 
measurable way. This means, that the documentation and analysis are not going to be 
limited to generating information, but also to making sure that knowledge is created 
upon that. Similarly, it is important to make sure that the created knowledge becomes 
part of their management systems and operations. Once the organization creates and 
accumulates knowledge within it, the next step is to collectively acquire and implement 
this knowledge across the organization and industry, to make sure no one is doomed to 
make the same mistakes. This can only be achieved by sharing the lessons learned and 
ensuring those lessons are not forgotten.  Trevor argued that achieving the first step 
(spreading the message) is relatively easy. However, ensuring that this message would 
become part of the organization is the real challenge [14]. Likewise, he asserted that 
“organizations have no memory, only people have memories and they move on” [14]. 
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Therefore, it is important to share lessons learned, create knowledge and make sure it 
will not remain just on paper. 
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4. LEARNING PROCESS 
 
Learning can be defined as the process in which humans acquire or modify 
knowledge through experience, education, or training [101]. Humans have the ability to 
learn and this process is based on their previous knowledge. Thus, the results from the 
same experience or training can be different for each person. Moreover, learning is not a 
linear process. It follows a learning curve, which decreases over time if not adequate 
reinforcement is performed. In order to ensure that learning has been achieved, a 
modification of human mental models and/or changes in their routine behavior is 
expected. 
When it comes to learning inside an organization, human behavior cannot be 
considered as a single component in the organizational system. It is required to consider 
the interactions and relationships among them. Thus, the learning process is no longer 
considered as an individual process, instead, it is considered as an organizational 
process, in which, people try to acquire knowledge together and preserve it over time. 
The challenge is to ensure that everyone within the organization manages, interprets, and 
transfers knowledge effectively as needed. Likewise, companies have to ensure that 
knowledge will remain available even if there are changes in personnel. As stated by 
Kletz, “organizations have no memory, only people have memory and they move on” 
[15]. In this context, organizations have been focusing on how to manage knowledge and 
preserve it over time. These with the purpose of improve continually, avoid the same 
mistakes, and consequently prevent incidents.  
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4.1. Learning system  
In the learning system for the chemical and oil and gas industry, three entities can 
be identified as components that have the ability to learn:  individual, organization, and 
industry. For the purpose of this research, the learning is based on previous incidents, the 
implementation of lessons learned, and best practices. Learning occurs from the smallest 
entity to the biggest one. Thus, once an incident occurs, the individuals involved in it are 
going to challenge their mental models and identify the potential causes of the incident 
and consequently learn from experience. However, due to the complexity of the human 
behavior, it can be expected that a small portion of the people who experience an 
incident, choose to ignore it.   
Depending on the severity of the incident, reporting plays an important role in 
the learning system. In the case of near misses, the safety culture of the organization is 
challenged and the individuals involved in the near miss have to decide whether or not to 
report the event. On the contrary, in the case of a major incident, the process safety team 
is usually part of the immediate executive actions; therefore, reporting is not required 
from the individuals that experienced the incidents to the safety team. Moreover, 
organizations need to notify the corresponding regulatory agencies and determine their 
role in the investigation process.  
Once the incident is reported, the significance of the incident needs to be 
determined. In this process, the safety team has to evaluate the impact of the incident and 
based on those results, the safety team would determine whether or not the incident 
would be investigated in detail. This means to perform an incident investigation process, 
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in which the root causes, lessons learned, and recommendations are determined. 
Organizational learning occurs once each individual who is part of the organization has 
acquired and processed the new knowledge that is being taught and collectively 
implement the lessons learned. The ultimate level of learning is the industry learning, in 
which the organizations share the lessons learned and transfer the existing knowledge 
across the industry. This is done with the objective of having an updated knowledge and 
improves collectively. Figure 11. shows the system explained before. 
 
 
Figure 11 Learning system, adapted from [90] 
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4.1.1. Limitations in the learning system 
The learning system presented in the previous section, gives an idea of how the 
system works, the entities involved and their role in the learning process. Additionally, it 
gives a bigger picture of the main steps and sequence of the learning process. Based on 
this diagram, together with the available literature review in this field, it is evident that 
organizations still see knowledge as temporal factor that is inherent to the people 
involved in the organization, instead of a part of their management systems. Thus, 
organizations fail to transcend from individual learning to organizational learning. In 
addition, they fail to provide the required tools to enhance the individual learning 
process in order to ensure higher levels of retention and sense of ownership. Finally, the 
chemical and oil and gas industry fails to understand the need of putting all resources 
together to improve as a whole. In this context, several limitations that inhibit learning 
have been identified:  
 Identification of root causes: the incident investigation management systems set the 
basis to ensure learning from incidents, because it ensures that the fundamental 
causes of the incidents have been identified and managed properly. Thus, incident 
investigation requires an appropriate level of expertise during all phases of 
investigation, from the collection of evidence until the development of 
recommendations. This would ensure that the collected data is reliable, adequate, 
and complete. Moreover, that the analysis has been performed with sufficient detail 
and the root causes have been identified. Organizations tend to identify direct 
causes as the root causes of incidents. Thus, recommendations tend to solve 
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superficial problems that do not prevent similar incidents in the future. Direct 
causes such as human error are usually identified as root cause, and investigation 
process ends placing the blame on the operators instead of identifying failures in the 
management system that contributed to the execution of the unsafe acts. This 
misinterpretation of concepts inhibits organizations from developing high quality 
incident reports and blocks the continuous improvement of the management 
systems. Organizations need to ensure three key elements in order to be able to 
identify root causes. First, they have to provide adequate tools to perform the 
analysis of the investigation. The incident investigation team needs to be supported 
with standardized methodologies and procedures to guide them through the whole 
process. Second, organizations have to provide appropriate training regarding 
incident investigation to ensure a pool of trained people who are familiar with the 
incident investigation process and methodologies applied in the organization. 
Finally, organizations have to ensure appropriate level of expertise based on the 
nature of the incident to guarantee the required technical knowledge during the 
analysis.  
 Promote reporting of near misses: learning should be promoted from every valuable 
source of information. Therefore, organizations do not have to wait until a major 
incident happened to improve their system. Acquiring data and information and 
analyzing it, give the opportunity to learn and consequently prevent the occurrence 
of major incidents and avoid losses. In this context, near misses give a significant 
amount of information to identify trends and high potential consequence incidents. 
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It can also helps identifying failures in the management system and consequently 
provide improvement opportunities. Promoting the report of near misses becomes a 
crucial element for organizations to analyze more frequent incidents and extract 
their knowledge. Achieving the expected results is challenging for organizations 
because it requires a healthy reporting culture, in which the individual punishment 
is avoided. This means, creating an open culture, where employees feel confident to 
report incidents and everyone feel responsible for their own and their co-workers 
safety. Moreover, promoting the report of near misses require the engagement of the 
top management level to ensure the required resources and time.  
 Ensure implementation of lessons learned: Organizations usually spend a 
significant amount of resources during incident investigations processes. However, 
this effort decreases drastically once the recommendations have been developed and 
the final report has been presented. Organizations fail to support the implementation 
process and therefore, no actual learning is performed. In the majority of the cases, 
learning is limited to the development of the report but actions are not executed. 
Thus, organizations inhibit the organizational learning because no actual knowledge 
has been transfer to the organization. Moreover, investigators play an important role 
in the development of those recommendations, in order to ensure that they are clear, 
measurable, and feasible; and consequently, people in charge of executing those 
actions can easily understand what is intended and set the right timeline and 
resources. 
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 Ensure sharing knowledge within the organization: the ultimate goal of incident 
investigations is to prevent similar incidents from happening again. In this sense, 
the extracted learning from those investigations should to be spread out across the 
organization in order to ensure that different facilities all around the world, can get 
those lessons and extract their knowledge. Although organizations communicate 
lessons learned, they usually fail to give the message in an appropriate way. This 
means to understand the different types of targets across the organization and 
unpack those lessons learned in a way that people can understand how those lessons 
would impact them. Furthermore, this sharing is limited in most of the cases to 
safety moments or emails, but there is no discussion or analysis of the applicability 
of those lessons to their own process or facility.  
 Use and understanding of databases and academic resources: knowledge 
management has become a key element in organizational learning, in order to ensure 
that the data and information is stored and easily extracted when people need it. 
Thus, databases play an important role to maintain information is available across the 
organization. Additionally, academic resources for large organizations that have the 
budget or external databases can help organizations to extract new information and 
learn from external resources that handle similar processes. The main objective of 
those external resources is that organizations learn and improve as a whole, as an 
industry, instead of getting partial learning in few organizations. In this sense, the 
industry fails in two different ways: First, the industry faces a competing and 
politicized environment [56], in which organizations are not willing to share their 
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lessons learned and best practices. Therefore, there is a lack of external information 
from which others organizations could learn. Secondly, even in the cases where the 
information is out there, organizations fail to understand the importance of those 
external tools and therefore people are either not aware of there existence or are not 
interested in using them. Finally, Organizations usually communicated external 
lessons learned from big incidents, but people see that type of incidents as events that 
could not happen in their own processes and therefore little attention is put into 
analyzing how those lessons learned are applicable to their processes and how that 
information could make their facility safer.  
 Validation of leading indicators: process safety indicators provide evidence about 
the actual state of a particular process or activity. It helps organizations to get the 
right signals before an incident materializes and therefore, take appropriate actions to 
get the process back to normal. When an incident occurs, people involved in the 
process spend little or no time analyzing why they failed to get the right signals. Was 
the process giving the right signals? Were the indicators well defined? Why did 
operators fail to understand those indicators? These types of questions have to be 
answered after each incident investigation, in order to reevaluate the process, where 
the incident occurred and make sure operators can get all the required information 
and understand the process’s behavior. 
This research has focused in the analysis of four of the limitations mentioned 
above: ensure implementation of lessons learned, use and understanding of databases 
and academic resources, ensure sharing knowledge within the organization, and 
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identification of root causes. The first three limitations have been addressed in this 
section. The last limitation: identification of root causes is covered in section 5.  
 
4.2. DIKM model 
In order to improve learning from incidents, it is required to ensure a corporate 
memory system within the organization, in which an organizational memory is present 
and knowledge is effectively transferred and maintained through generations. The Data-
Information-Knowledge-Wisdom model (DIKM) fits the needs mentioned above and it 
has been widely used for many organizations to manage knowledge. The model 
describes the relationship among data, information, knowledge, and wisdom, and the 
transformation of each element to a higher level [102, 103]. Thus, the model represents 
how organizations can increase meaning and value as they go higher in the pyramid, as 
shown in Figure 12. An extensive literature about this model and knowledge 
management is available elsewhere [43, 104-106]. A summarized definition of each 
element is provided to understand the structure of the model and its link with the 
learning process.   
 Data can be defined as values without context or interpretation. They can be 
symbols, signals or numbers with no structure [102, 103]. 
 Information can be defined as data that has been processed for a purpose. It is 
data that have been organized so it can have meaning for the user [102]. 
 Knowledge can be defined as the transformation of information, in which expert 
opinion, skills, and experience has been added. Knowledge is the synthesis of 
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multiple resources of information over time, in order to understand patterns and 
support decision-making [102]. 
 Wisdom can be defined as accumulated knowledge. It requires an understanding 
of principles, so it can be seen as an expert knowledge and judgment associated 
with the meaning of life [102, 103]. 
 
 
Figure 12 DIKW Model, adapted from [102]  
 
This research has been focused only in one type of knowledge: safety knowledge. 
It converges technical, human and organizational aspects, that lead to influence people 
behavior and values. Thus, the learning process goal is to enhance, capture, refine, and 
implement safety knowledge so it can become part of the daily activities and culture of 
the organization. The DIKW theory has been used as basis to construct a framework to 
improve the learning process within an organization.  
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4.3. Learning process 
Based on an extensive review of the available literature and benchmarking within 
oil and gas organizations, consulting companies and subject matter experts, a framework 
for the learning process inside an organization has been developed. The framework 
suggests a standardized approach to leverage the safety knowledge within an 
organization. It includes seven steps that should be followed in sequence in order to 
improve learning from experience. The steps included in the framework are intended to 
serve as a guideline for organizations that want to get a better understanding on how to 
obtain information and make it valuable. That is, transforming information into 
knowledge, by making it part of the organization and ensuring a corporate memory 
system inside of it.  
In order to leverage the safety knowledge inside the organization, it is required to 
establish a corporate learning system, which should be owned by all employees in the 
organization. The system should be easily understood and accessed when required. The 
corporate learning system has two main objectives. First, make new information and 
lessons learned part of the organization. This means, to make those lessons learned part 
of the existing resources in the organization such as procedures and guidelines. In this 
context, people can have access to lessons learned related with the information that they 
are looking for and at the time they want it. This would help as a reminder about what 
can go wrong with the specific activity they are intended to perform. Second, the 
corporate learning system needs to support implementation and decision-making of new 
alternatives with the objective of making their facilities safer. To ensure that the 
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information and knowledge that is being added will remain in the organization, it is 
important to document the whole process, make sure a proper management of change 
process is performed prior to any change, and link the reasons that support the 
alternatives. The last point is intended to ensure that people will understand the reasons 
of why the alternative was implemented at that time and the analysis behind it.   
Most of the people involved in the organization are not even aware of where to 
find information and the potential benefits they can get from it. On the contrary, some 
people are aware about the available sources of information, but they do not know how 
to take advantage of this information. People inside the organization have access to a 
high volume of information but in many cases they do not have the time to identify 
which information is important, which information is valuable and should to be 
transformed into knowledge, and which information is not that relevant for them. As a 
consequence, people lose relevant information that can be applied to their facilities. 
People act based on what it is important for them and what they consider relevant for 
their work and would have a potential benefit for them. Therefore, transferring 
knowledge is a complex task, in which identifying the target and having a clear 
understanding of why it is important to them, becomes a crucial step to achieve learning. 
In this context, a lesson learned from an incident could be explained with technical detail 
to a supervisor, whom has the engineering background to understand the concepts 
involved on it. However, the same lesson learned has to be delivered in a different way 
to an operator, so he can understand and process the same information as the supervisor, 
without loosing the knowledge that is intended to be transfer.  
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Some organizations have spent a lot of effort developing sophisticated systems to 
store lessons learned and relevant information. Nevertheless, they fail to achieve the 
complete cycle, in which people within the organization own the system and understand 
it. The corporate learning system should be incorporated as part of the safety 
management system of the organization, the top management should support it, and all 
levels in the organization should be trained on it. The training would explain the benefits 
of it, the role of the corporate learning team and the people involved on it.  Moreover, 
the training would give guidelines on how to use the Document Management System 
(DMS), when to use it and the type of information that can be extracted from it.  
4.3.1. Corporate learning team 
A corporate safety team should be in charge of managing the corporate learning 
system. The team has to be a group of subject matter experts with relevant knowledge in 
the processes, products and types of facilities inside the organization. The people in 
charge of the corporate learning system serves as a source of knowledge for the different 
facilities and people in the organization. In this context, they would be the bridge 
between the information and knowledge that need to be digested and implemented. 
Moreover, the team has the responsibility of filtering the information in order to ensure 
that the information that is being added is valid and reliable. It should be noted that the 
team is not intended to impose or enforce the implementation of lessons learned in the 
facilities, rather, the team is intended to guide facilities to get the right information and 
direct them in the right direction. The objective of the team is to support decision-
making and provide the necessary resources to implement new alternatives. In this sense, 
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the corporate learning team would be responsible to acquire new information, validate 
and analyze the applicability, disseminate the information to the intended targets, ensure 
the availability of the information, and support implementation as required.  
It is important to notice that a single team of experts it is not enough to determine 
what information is relevant for the organization. In addition, it is not possible to have 
the level of expertise in all areas of process safety. Thus, a pool of experts in different 
areas within the organization should be linked with the corporate learning team, in order 
to provide support in the analysis and selection of potential knowledge that should be 
acquired by the organization. In this sense, the pool of experts would serve as a guideline 
or consulting assistance for the corporate learning system. 
4.3.2. Flow of information 
Information and knowledge are important components in the management of any 
safety system. The system has to ensure the availability, accuracy and updated 
knowledge, in order to support the learning process and decision-making. Inside the 
system two different types of information can be identified: internal and external 
information. Internal information refers to the information that is created inside the 
organization, such as incident investigation reports, best practices and performance 
indicators reports. Conversely, external information refers to the information that is 
obtained from agencies, databases, academic resources and other organizations. This 
information can be lessons learned, new standards, best practices, recommended 
practices, etc.  
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The corporate learning system has the challenge to effectively manage all 
channels and types of information at the right time and to the right target. Therefore, the 
system should be supported by a Document Management System (DMS), in which all 
the information would be uploaded easily and extracted as needed. In addition, the DMS 
needs to keep the information up to date and link the new information with the existing 
documents of the organization. 
 
 
Figure 13 Flows of information in the corporate learning system 
 
In this context, the corporate learning system would acquire internal and external 
information, which is going to be analyzed and validated by the corporate learning team. 
The relevant information would then be incorporated into the DMS and linked to the 
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existing documentations as required. Then, the team together with representatives of 
each facility, in which the knowledge is intend to be transferred, would work together to 
determine the best approach to implement that knowledge into the facility. After 
implementation, the facility would provide some feedback to the corporate learning team 
to ensure continuous improvement and verified the effectiveness of the process. At the 
same time, each facility is responsible for providing internal information to the system to 
assure that the information is analyzed for different facilities across the organization and 
it is not just communicated. This flow of information is shown in Figure 13.  
4.3.3. Learning process description 
The learning process consists of seven steps: enhance internal information, 
acquire information, assess alternatives, define metrics, refine alternative, implement 
alternative, and monitor performance. The process describes how the corporate learning 
system would work and the key elements that need to be considered in each step. The 
first two steps refer to the acquisition of relevant data and information into the system 
and the last five steps refer to the transformation of that information into knowledge. A 
diagram of the process is shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14 Learning process 
 
4.3.3.1. Enhance internal information 
Enhance internal information refers to the process in which the incident 
investigation process and final product of is improved by the incorporation of additional 
steps in the process. Its goal is to provide a more detailed analysis of the incident and the 
safety management system of the area where the incident occurred. The process is 
enhanced through the investigation of all incidents with significance, the review of 
previous internal incidents and similar external incidents, the revalidation of 
performance indicators of the process, and the identification of failures in the 
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management system. Additionally, this step support organizations to effectively identify 
organizational, design and cultural failures instead of human errors as root cause of 
incidents. This step is explained in detail in section 5.  
4.3.3.2. Acquire information 
Once the organization can rely on the internal information that is created inside 
of it, the next step is to acquire additional information from different sources. In this 
sense, it is important to identify the potential sources from which relevant information 
can be extracted. As explained previously, there are two types of sources: internal and 
external. Internal information would be acquired from the different facilities within the 
organization. Likewise, internal information would be gained from all branch offices 
around the world that are part of the same organization. This information would be 
primarily lessons learned from incident investigations. However, information such as 
best practices and trend analysis reports can be considered as well. External information 
opens a wide window of opportunities from where new information can be acquired. The 
primary source of information would be available databases. Nowadays, there is still no 
single database available, which can provide full access to a large number of incidents in 
the chemical and oil and gas industry and, at the same time, have all the desirable 
features such as easily searchable, public, with multiple filters options, and with detailed 
analysis reports. Therefore, it is necessary to use a combination of multiple databases. 
Regulatory agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have their own 
database, from which information regarding toxic releases can be found. The Chemical 
Safety Board [6] provides detailed analyses of process safety incidents. However, the 
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amount of incidents investigated is limited. Some public databases such as eMARS 
developed by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) provides incidents reports 
involving highly hazardous substances. Likewise, private databases such as Process 
Safety Incident Database (PSID) created by CCPS, provides incidents reports for 
organizations participating on it. Additional information can be acquired from external 
associations like the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA), which provides guidelines for standards and best 
practices. Finally, large organizations that have the budget also have the opportunity to 
established partnership with academic entities in order to be involved and have access to 
trending investigations from first hand. This type of partnership can be established with 
universities like Texas A&M, which houses Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center. 
It is evident the wide area from which safety information can be extracted. Thus, it is 
important that the corporate learning team set the basis and defines the scope and 
objectives of it. Moreover, those objectives have to be aligned with the organization’s 
goals and business priorities.  
4.3.3.3. Assess alternatives 
Once the team has prioritized the alternatives that could be valuable for the 
organization and fit the needs of it, they have to identify the potential processes, 
facilities or business areas, where the alternative could be applied and would gain 
benefits from it. Those relevant installations are the potential target, where the 
information could be translated into knowledge and consequently be implemented into 
their processes. During this process the corporate learning team has the responsibility of 
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determining and classifying the potential targets and the channels of communication that 
are going to be used during the process. The information can be communicated into two 
different approaches: sharing the information or transferring the information. Sharing the 
information refers to the communication to an arbitrary receiver. In this case, it would be 
facilities that might be interested in the information but no action is required from them. 
Conversely, transferring the information refers to the communication to a specific 
receiver, who in this case would be facilities in which the new or alternative information 
could be implemented and the potential knowledge is intended to be transferred.  
Transferring the information requires a high level of commitment from the 
different facilities that have been selected as potential targets. From this point, a member 
or members of the corporate learning team would meet with some representatives of the 
potential target and would work together in the analysis of the alternative. Through 
meetings the objective is to communicate the alternative and the assumptions that have 
been made in order to determine why it is applicable for them. Then, they would 
evaluate together the applicability of this alternative to their process, by analyzing the 
potential benefits, costs and risk associated with the implementation or not of the 
alternative. This process has to be documented and the final decision has to be 
supported. It is important to mention, that the objective of those meetings is to take the 
time to really analyze the alternative, rather than enforce the implementation of it. At the 
end, the final decision would be made by each installation. Not all alternatives have to be 
implemented because in some cases the alternative would be not feasible to implement 
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to that specific process or they are just handling the risk with different alternatives that 
are valid as well.  
Some alternatives can be applied across the organization and do not require the 
identification of potential targets. Therefore, for those alternatives the corporate learning 
team should develop an action plan and execute it as part of their job. One example for 
this type of alternatives can be a modification to a procedure that is applicable to all 
facilities. In this context, the team together with a subject matter expert would be 
responsible for making the required changes, documenting the changes, incorporating 
them into the DMS, communicating it and ensuring training as needed. 
4.3.3.4. Define metrics 
This step requires asking the questions of how they can validate what they want 
to achieve? How they can know the alternative is operating as expected? Defining 
performance indicators allow people to verify the system behavior and measure how 
much it has been changed with respect to the initial set point. Indicators should be 
determined prior to implementation in order to have a clear picture of what they want to 
achieve with it. Likewise, it would help to verify the results since initial phases. 
Indicators would change depending of the actual phase of the alternative and would give 
real data to determine if the alternative is giving the expected results.  
Conversely, indicators for the corporate learning system should be determined as 
well, to evaluate the performance of the system and identify improving opportunities for 
it. In this sense, indicators to analyze how the system operates, personnel performance, 
feedback and results of the system should be defined and evaluate periodically. 
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Indicators such as the number of identified alternatives vs. the number of alternatives 
implemented, percentage of people trained on how to corporate learning system works 
and how to take advantage of it, percentage of alternatives that are rejected by the 
facilities, the number of deficiencies identified in the system, or number of management 
review of the system can be used as metrics for the system.  
4.3.3.5. Refine alternative 
Defining metrics and refining the alternative should be performed at the same 
time, because once the facility is fitting the alternative to their own processes, some 
modifications or alterations to the initial idea might be necessary. However, initial 
metrics have to be determined to set the general goal of the alternative. Refining the 
alternative refers to the process in which the facility has to define the limitations, 
assumptions, boundaries and required resources based on their own needs and capacity. 
Similarly, refining the alternative requires to perform a management of change process 
in order to determine the potential impact to the process and people and the additional 
considerations that need to be made prior implementation. Finally, an action plan has to 
be developed, in which a detailed list of tasks, timeline and resources should be 
evidenced.  
4.3.3.6. Implement alternative 
Implement the alternative refers to the actual execution of the action plan that has 
been proposed by the facility. Each facility would be responsible for the execution and 
verification of it. However, the corporate learning team should verify periodically its 
 86 
 
current status. Likewise, the corporate learning team would support the whole process 
based on what has been agreed during the evaluation phase of the alternative. 
4.3.3.7. Monitor performance 
Monitor performance refers to continuous improvement to validate and refine the 
implemented alternatives and corporate learning system. At this point, a detailed review 
should be performed to verify if the knowledge was successfully transferred, if the 
knowledge was appropriate, was analyzed in detail, accurate criteria was used, and the 
expected benefits were achieved. Moreover, the team has to analyze if the 
implementation was performed as expected and what can be improved from it. Based on 
the improvement opportunities that have been found during this analysis, the alternative 
can be improved and refined as needed or can be modified if the expected results were 
not successfully achieved. Additionally, the corporate learning system should be 
validated in order to determine if the process has been successfully implemented across 
the organization. In this analysis the corporate learning team should evaluate if the 
objectives have been achieved, if people are fully committed with the system and feel 
part of it, if the organization is getting the right knowledge, if the level of competence in 
the team is adequate, and how the cycle and each phase of it can be improved.  
 
4.4. Additional elements to achieve organizational learning  
In the learning system presented in the first section of this section, three types of 
learning were identified: individual, organizational and industrial learning. Learning is 
achieved through the small entity to a bigger one. In this case, industry learning only can 
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be achieved once and organizational learning has been achieved. Similarly, 
organizational learning is achieved once individual learning has been achieved for 
people involved in the organization. Even though this research has been focused on the 
understanding and improvement of organizational learning, it is important to mention 
that achieving individual learning becomes an essential part of achieving organizational 
learning. Therefore, organizations need to provide the necessary tools and resources in 
order to support and enhance individual learning for all employees. As a result, 
individual learning collectively is transformed into an organizational learning and at the 
same time, an effective organizational learning is able to support each phase of 
employee's individual learning as presented in Figure 15.  
 
 
Figure 15 Improving organizational learning 
 
Supporting the individual learning can be achieved through the development of 
corporate learning systems in which the knowledge is being managed within the 
organization and a learning environment is encouraged, as been discussed in the 
previous sections. Conversely, transcending the individual learning to an organizational 
one requires the implementation of adequate training programs and supporting 
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techniques, which enables people to individually acquire new information, analyze it and 
apply it into their daily jobs. Some of these elements are briefly discussed below.  
4.4.1. Effective training programs  
Developing and delivering effective training programs ensure the basis for a 
successfully corporate learning system, which enables employees to gain an 
understanding of the main goals, structure, and expectations of the organization. Thus, 
an effective training program should address the following elements: 
 Detailed training needs matrix for all employees’ position in the organization. 
 Specific qualification criteria for trainer’s selection. These criteria should include 
the necessary technical knowledge that is intent to be transferred as well as the 
necessary soft skills such as good communicator, presentation skills, able to open 
healthily discussions, etc. 
 Expectations, goals and final product of each training course.  
 Up to date training material, which covers all relevant technical knowledge and 
can be easily understood for the trainees.  
 Required tools, resources and infrastructure to perform the predefined training 
courses.  
4.4.2. Effective training courses  
As discussed in section two, organizations should apply different training 
techniques in their training programs based on the predefined expectations of the course 
and the current needs of the organization. Although lectures methods are the most 
common applied technique in most organizations, this method is not able to support 
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skills and attitudes development. Thus, it is important to recognize the use of multiple 
training techniques in order to be able to provide a successful training program, which 
enables employees to acquire and develop knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Similarly, 
higher levels of retention’ techniques such as group discussions and practices cannot be 
fully achieved without the understanding and analysis of the theory behind it. For 
instance, organizations can implement the use of simulators to teach operators how to 
perform a specific task and achieved the necessary skills to perform it. However, if the 
use of simulators is not supplemented with additional training techniques such as 
lectures, readings, and discussions, it is likely that the operator is not going to be able to 
make decisions on his own once he experiences an abnormal situation during his real 
job. The operator would not have the required technical knowledge and analysis to 
understand the process behavior and potential outcomes of it.  
Once the training techniques have been defined, it is also important to structure 
the development of the course and the elements that trainers must take into consideration 
during the preparation, execution, and evaluation of the course.  First, trainers have to 
determine the objectives of the course; this requires the understanding of the target and 
their motivation. In this sense, the challenge is to identify why is this new knowledge 
relevant to them, instead of thinking why it is important for the trainer or the 
organization. This with the objective of answering the questions: do they want to know 
that? Or do they need to know that? And based on it, trainers can take the best approach 
for creating ownership about the knowledge that is being taught. Secondly, the 
development of the course should be problem-solving oriented in which they are able to 
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analyze situations and make decisions about it. In addition, it should encourage trainees 
to seek for more information and create spaces where they have to explain to others what 
they are learning. This would allow trainees to digest the information and take the time 
to consolidate this knowledge and fitting it into their existing knowledge. Thirdly, each 
lesson has to clearly identify the benefits trainees can get for it in order to maintain their 
motivation. Likewise, it is always a good approach teaching with examples because this 
enables them to be familiar with the situation and recreate this new knowledge into their 
own situations, and at the same time, it increases trainer’s credibility. Finally, trainees 
should receive constant feedback during the development of the course and an 
assessment should be incorporated as part of the process to help trainees refresh concepts 
and identifying the key elements of the course. This assessment should be problem-
solving oriented [107-109]. 
4.4.3. Supporting unlearning processes 
As Pighin and Marzona stated, “unlearning is defined as throwing away concepts 
learnt in the past to give space for possible new learning” [110]. In this sense, 
organizations should support employees in the transition from the old knowledge to the 
new one and provide the required tools and resources to make the transition easier at 
both individual and organizational level. In the process safety field more attention have 
been given to the development of management of change programs in order to ensure 
that risks are controlled once the organization makes changes in their facilities, 
operations or personnel. However, less attention has been given to the cultural and 
organizational factors, as well as the individual impact that may be influenced by those 
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changes. Therefore, management of change programs should incorporated individual, 
organizational and cultural aspects that may be also influenced by the changes that are 
made in the organization. The unlearning process can help organizations to identify the 
potential impact of those changes and provide the corresponding plan to overcome the 
resistant to changes attitudes that may arise from learning processes.  
Some of the elements that people who are intended to transmit the new 
knowledge should take into account are briefly discussed below. First, the acquisition of 
new knowledge is not always an easy process for some employees, and it is even harder 
when they have been doing their job in a particular way for many years. Therefore, it is 
important to identify the potential impact of this change (new knowledge) and develop 
mitigation actions to overcome these factors. Secondly, it is essential to understand that 
there is going to be resistant of change because it is part of human behavior and it cannot 
be prevented. But at the same time, it is important to note that the resistant of change can 
be temporary if proper actions are taken to manage it. Thus, instead of having a negative 
attitude of what employees are going to say or how they are going to complain about it, 
organizations should be focusing on predicting those behaviors and developing 
corrective actions for those attitudes. Thirdly, once the person in charge of transmitting 
the new knowledge is in contact with the target, he has to explain to them the 
requirements of the process. This means, to explain why this change is necessary for the 
organization and why this new knowledge is important for them, instead of start 
explaining how to perform the new task or going in detail to the technical part. This step 
gives them the opportunity to analyze how these new requirements fit into their existing 
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knowledge and potentially identify some gaps during this process. Finally, the new 
knowledge can be transmitted, follow by the identification of resistant to change 
attitudes and the implementation of corrective actions. This process should be performed 
over and over again until the new knowledge has been consolidated in all employees 
involved in the process [110]. 
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5. ENHANCE INTERNAL INFORMATION 
 
In this section, the first step of the learning process enhance internal 
information is introduced in detail. This section presents the incident investigation 
process throughout the development of a task analysis in order to analyze the 
relationship among the people, the task, and the environment for a specific task. The 
corresponding results were then used to enhance the existing incident investigation 
process by the incorporation of additional steps into the process.  Finally, a description 
of each of the incorporated steps is provided.  
 
5.1. Task analysis  
A task analysis is performed with the objective of enhancing the understanding 
of how the people, environment, and task work together and how the system is 
supporting this process [111-113]. A hierarchical task analysis has been developed for 
the incident investigation process to analyze the task’s objectives in this process, the 
people involved in it, the complexity of the task and the expected goals for each stage in 
the process. The general structure of an incident investigation process involves the 
following steps: reporting, collecting evidence, analyzing evidence, identifying the 
causes of the incident, developing recommendations, and sharing lessons learned. A 
more comprehensive description of the incident investigation process has been presented 
in section 3. The incident investigation process has been divided into subtasks and the 
most challenging tasks have been selected for further analysis. Each category has been 
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broken down into more detail tasks to understand specific goals of each step of the 
process. Nine subtasks have been selected for detailed analysis in which the common 
errors were determined. Finally, the general characteristics of the people and 
environment for the selected subtask were discussed.  
5.1.1. Hierarchical task analysis decomposition 
Figures 16-18 present the hierarchical task decomposition for the incident 
investigation process. The steps highlighted in gray represent the subtasks that have been 
considered the most complex and challenging in the process. Thus, a further analysis has 
been performed in the next section. The following subtask were selected:  
 Report incident 
 Select investigation team 
 Visit scene: 
- Interview witnesses  
- Gather preliminary evidence 
 Analyze evidence 
 Apply incident investigation methodology 
- Identify root causes and contributing factors 
 Develop recommendations 
 Define responsible and resources 
 Monitor status of recommendations 
5.1.2. Hierarchical task analysis results 
Tables 1-7   present the results obtained from the hierarchical task analysis. 
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Figure 16 Task analysis decomposition part 1 
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Figure 17 Task analysis decomposition part 2 
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Figure 18 Task analysis decomposition part 3 
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Table 1 Hierarchical task analysis part 1 
Task People Environment Why is Challenging? Common Errors 
Report 
incident Employees 
Varies depending of 
the safety culture 
 
Mechanism for 
reporting  
 
Level of engagement 
of the top 
management 
 
 
Requires a strong safety culture within 
the organization 
 
Employees have to be engaged with 
their work 
 
The organization has to ensure an open 
and healthy reporting environment in 
which individual blame is avoided 
 
Employees feel that they are going to 
lose their jobs 
 
Tendency to cover up 
mistakes 
 
Employees fail to 
understand the benefits 
they can get from the 
investigation of incidents 
 
Top management tends 
to blame employees 
Select 
investiga
tion team 
Safety  
Department 
 
Management 
Pressure against 
time 
 
Level of engagement 
of the top 
management 
 
Working with others 
to make decisions  
 
Requires a pool of trained people in 
incident investigation 
 
Availability of personnel (100% of their 
time for a short period of time) 
 
Based on the complexity of the system 
where the incident occurred, specific 
expertise is required 
Select investigation team 
based on availability of 
personnel 
 
Selected people have 
little or no training in 
incident investigation 
process 
 
Required expertise in the 
team is ignored 
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Table 2 Hierarchical task analysis part 2 
 
Task People Environment Why is Challenging? Common Errors 
Interview 
witnesses 
Incident 
investigation 
team 
Pressure against time 
 
External entities involved in the 
process 
 
Working with new people to 
make decisions 
 
High volume of pressure, 
emotions, and uncertainty  
 
The incident investigation team 
set aside their routine work 
 
The investigation is a temporary 
job 
 
Different types of witnesses: 
Employees, usually operators 
that are part of the process 
 
Witnesses’ availability 
 
Memory recalls change over 
time 
 
Witnesses may be affected by a 
combination of emotions 
 
The information may not be 
accurate and witnesses may 
have different versions of the 
same incident 
 
Witnesses can make wrong 
assumptions 
Inexperienced people 
performed interviews 
 
Tendency to blame 
employees 
 
The interviewer 
attempts to get what he 
thinks happened 
instead of listening 
what the witness have 
to say 
 
Witnesses bias: they 
say what they think 
happened or hide facts 
they do not want to tell 
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Table 3 Hierarchical task analysis part 3 
 
 
 
Task People Environment Why is Challenging? Common Errors 
Gather 
preliminary 
evidence 
Incident 
investigation 
team 
Pressure against time 
 
External entities involved in the 
process 
 
Working with new people to make 
decisions 
 
High volume of pressure, emotions, 
and uncertainty  
 
The incident investigation team set 
aside their routine work 
 
The investigation is a temporary job 
 
Complexity of the system where the 
incident occurred 
 
 
The site may be severely 
damaged 
 
External regulatory 
agencies may have control 
of the site making access 
difficult 
 
Some physical evidence 
degrades with time 
 
Degree of difficulty of 
understanding of the 
incident during the analysis 
phase 
 
Loss of 
relevant 
evidence 
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Table 4 Hierarchical task analysis part 4 
 
 
Task People Environment Why is Challenging? Common Errors 
Analyze 
evidence 
Incident 
investigation 
team 
Pressure against time 
 
External entities involved in 
the process 
 
Working with new people to 
make decisions 
 
High volume of pressure, 
emotions, and uncertainty  
 
The incident investigation 
team set aside their routine 
work 
 
The investigation is a 
temporary job 
 
Complexity of the system 
where the incident occurred 
 
Requires expertise in incident 
investigation methodologies 
 
Requires expertise in the 
process where the incident 
occurred, the chemical 
involved, and the organization 
 
It is hard to make assumptions 
about what happened 
 
Some evidence may be 
missing.  
 
Pressure from different 
departments  
 
Degree of difficulty of 
understanding of the incident 
during the analysis phase 
 
Incorrect assumptions 
 
Insufficient evidence to 
select the most likely 
scenario 
 
Inadequate incident 
investigation 
methodologies and 
procedures 
 
Insufficient analysis 
and time spent on it 
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Table 5 Hierarchical task analysis part 5 
 
 
 
Task People Environment Why is Challenging? Common Errors 
Identify 
contributing 
factors and 
root causes 
Incident 
investigation 
team 
Pressure against time 
 
External entities involved in the 
process 
 
Working with new people to 
make decisions 
 
High volume of pressure, 
emotions, and uncertainty  
 
The incident investigation team 
set aside their routine work 
 
The investigation is a temporary 
job 
 
Complexity of the system where 
the incident occurred 
 
Requires expertise in 
incident investigation 
methodologies and analysis 
 
Requires expertise in the 
process where the incident 
occurred, the chemical 
involved and the 
organization 
 
Pressure from different 
departments  
 
Degree of difficulty of 
understanding of the incident 
during the analysis phase 
 
Identification of 
intermediary 
causes as root 
causes of the 
incident 
 
Improper analysis 
of results 
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Table 6 Hierarchical task analysis part 6 
  
 
 
Task People Environment Why is Challenging? Common Errors 
Develop 
recommendations 
Incident 
investigation 
team 
 
Management 
Pressure against time 
 
External entities involved in 
the process 
 
Working with new people to 
make decisions 
 
High volume of pressure, 
emotions, and uncertainty  
 
The incident investigation 
team set aside their routine 
work 
 
The investigation is a 
temporary job 
 
Reach an agreement with 
all the different groups of 
interest 
 
Recommendations have to 
respond to each identified 
cause in an effective 
manner 
 
Investigators can write 
ambiguous or unclear 
recommendations 
Superficial 
recommendations 
 
Unrelated 
recommendations 
with the identified 
causes of the 
incident 
 
Ambiguous or 
unclear 
recommendations 
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Table 7 Hierarchical task analysis part 7 
Task People Environment Why is Challenging? Common Errors 
Define 
responsible and 
resources 
Safety 
Department 
 
Management 
Pressure against time 
and resources 
 
Level of engagement 
of the top management 
 
Working with others 
to make decisions 
 
 
Employees’ availability 
 
Budget is limited 
 
There is no time for extra 
work 
 
Top management has to be 
engaged. 
 
Requires a strong safety 
culture within the 
organization 
 
Inadequate risk-ranked 
of recommendations 
 
Inadequate top 
management 
engagement 
 
Inadequate distribution 
of resources 
 
Monitor status of 
recommendations 
Safety 
Department 
 
Management 
Pressure against time 
and resources 
 
Level of engagement 
of the top management 
 
Working with others 
to make decisions 
 
Recommendations’ status is 
easily forgotten 
 
Top management and 
employees have to be 
engaged 
 
Requires a strong safety 
culture within the 
organization 
Recommendations are 
forgot and therefore are 
never implemented 
 
Recommendation’ 
status is only 
responsibility of the 
safety department 
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5.1.3. Subtasks analysis  
Since each incident investigation is a new process, the people involved and the 
environment is always changing depending on the severity of the incident and the unit 
where the incident occurred. In addition, the number of people in charge of the 
investigation, their backgrounds and previous experience regarding incident 
investigations would vary as well. Furthermore, the frequency of this task cannot be 
determined, since it would depend on the number of reported incidents and the type of 
incident. In the incident investigation process three groups of people were identified: 
employees who perform the task of reporting incidents, safety department and 
management, and the incident investigation team. Each of this group of people executes 
different stages during the incident investigation process and has different attributes. 
Therefore, they need to be considered separated.  
5.1.3.1. People: employees 
 Task: report incident 
- People that work within the organization and perform a specific task on it. 
Employees have different levels of education and backgrounds. However, employees 
are expected to have the same training regarding policies, values and goals of the 
organization. Additionally, employees are expected to have some preliminary 
training and/or awareness campaign regarding incident reporting.  
- Employees spend eight or more hours per day in their jobs. Reporting incidents is 
considered as an extra task besides their routine work.  
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- Employees need to be motivated and understand the benefits of it in order to report 
an incident.   
- Employees need to have general knowledge regarding safety and how to report an 
incident to perform the task.  
- No skills are required to perform this task.  
5.1.3.2. People: safety department, management 
 Tasks: Select investigation team, define responsible and resources, monitor status of 
recommendations 
- The tasks mentioned above are specific tasks that are performed in conjunction with 
two different groups of people: the safety department and the top management. The 
combination of both gives the necessary background in process safety and 
management to support decision-making. Thus, the safety department is in charge 
of providing expertise in the selection of personnel and determining the required 
resources to perform the investigation. Conversely, the top management is in charge 
of providing the required resources and ensuring personnel availability.  
- Their role is primarily decision-making to ensure that the investigation is executed 
with the right people, resources and time.   
- The safety department should have expertise in process safety and incident 
investigation in order to determine the severity of the incident and resources needed. 
- The top management should have knowledge in business and safety priorities, as 
well as the available budget in the organization to support decision-making.  
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- Both groups of people should have strong communication and leadership skills to 
coordinate different groups of people and make decisions within a short period of 
time. 
5.1.3.3 People: incident investigation team 
 Tasks: Interview witnesses, gather preliminary evidence, analyze evidence, identify 
contributing factors and root causes, develop recommendations 
- The people that are part of the incident investigation team are usually employees 
who have to suspend their routine job and perform the investigation as a temporary 
job. Thus, people have to perform the task within a short period of time and under a 
lot of pressure. 
- The team is composed of different background and experience, which enables the 
understanding of the incident by the combination of expertise. Depending on the 
nature of the incident the incident investigation team would vary and different types 
of background would be involved, such as engineers, safety specialist, maintenance 
operators, contractors, lawyers, etc. Therefore, the people involved usually have 
never worked together before.   
- Each member of the team needs to be trained in incident investigation and if 
possible, having previous experience in incident investigations.   
- People within the team should have communication and leadership skills in order to 
collect evidence, interview people and support the analysis process.  
- The team has to have a strong technical knowledge about the process where the 
incident occurred and the chemicals involved.  
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- At least one of the members of the team should have a strong background in incident 
investigation methodologies and root causes identification.  
5.1.3.4. Environment 
To perform this task successfully, it is required to have a strong safety culture 
within the organization in which employees and the top management are engaged with it 
and an open and healthy reporting environment is encouraged. Similarly, depending on 
the level of engagement of management and employees, the right amount of resources 
and time would be spent during this task. 
The environment where the task is performed is the facility where the incident 
occurred. These are chemical and oil and gas facilities such as refineries, platforms, 
onshore facilities, etc. The investigation is executed at the same time that employees are 
performing their job or some of them may be recovering from the consequences of the 
incident. Furthermore, the unit where the incident occurred may be destroyed or heavily 
damaged by the incident, making it difficult to have access to the information.  
Reporting the incident is executed depending on the available tools that the 
organization has for reporting incidents. This can be verbal reporting, written forms or 
electronic forms. Likewise, the investigation analysis is executed depending on the 
available tools and training within the organization. These tools refer to the incident 
investigation methodologies that the organization has established depending on the 
severity of the incident. Additional tools are the available procedures and guidelines for 
the protocol prior the investigation, the development of the investigation, and required 
post-activities. 
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5.1.4. Task analysis remarks 
The task analysis developed for the incident investigation process gives more 
relevant insights of the process. First, the quality of the investigation is proportional to 
the level of training, previous experience performing the same task, and level of 
expertise of the incident investigation team. Thus, organizations should have a pool of 
experts in incident investigation methodologies as well as incident investigation 
processes. Likewise, it is important to gather the right level of technical knowledge 
based on the type of incident and its significance. Secondly, the safety culture of the 
organization plays a fundamental role in the success of investigations, because it 
determines the number of incidents that are going to be reported, the resources 
availability, time spent, and engagement of the top management, as well as employees 
who are in charge of the execution of recommendations. Similarly, the safety culture will 
determine if recommendations are implemented and the whole incident investigation 
process is completed. Third, communication, teamwork, and leadership skills are 
significant contributing factors in the process. These skills enable the team to organize 
relevant information, interview people, analyze the incident and work together in the 
development of recommendations. In addition, these skills enable the team to complete 
the investigation on time and with sufficient analysis. Finally, developing 
recommendations was identified as one critical task in the process because it converges 
all the effort and knowledge spent into the analysis. Moreover, recommendations are the 
final output of the investigation. Therefore, the quality of it is going to be measured 
based on the feasibility, clearness, and adequacy of the recommendations.  
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Additionally, the task decomposition and analysis of it identified some of the 
limitations of the process and improving opportunities on it. Since the environment and 
people involved in the investigation are always changing, the organization miss valuable 
information that can be used in future incident investigations. As a result, each 
investigation is a new process in which the learning curve has to start from zero each 
time. This gives the opportunity to enhance the process by the incorporation of 
knowledge from previous incidents and extracts this knowledge for the incident that is 
being analyzed. Similarly, the current incident investigation process does not support the 
identification of required changes in the management system, which enables 
organizations to identify cultural, management conditions, and system deficiencies that 
increase the risk in the organization. Furthermore, the training material is not updated in 
order to ensure a complete learning cycle of the incident. Moreover, the re-evaluation of 
leading indicators of the process is not considered in the incident investigation process.  
 
5.2. Proposed incident investigation process 
Enhance internal information refers to the process in which the incident 
investigation process is conducted and the final product of it have been analyzed and 
additional steps have been incorporated into the process. The objective is to provide a 
more detailed analysis of the incident and the safety management system, where the 
incident occurred. Since incident investigations are one of the most powerful practices to 
learn from experience, organizations need to focus their attention on improving their 
incident investigation management programs to provide high-quality recommendations 
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and ensure that organizational and cultural failures are identified [77, 91]. Incident 
investigation process refers to the sequence of stages addressed after an incident 
happens. Starting from the report of the incident, followed by the collection of evidence, 
incident investigation analysis, development of recommendations, communication of 
lessons learned, and follow-up of recommendations [80, 81]. Regardless of the incident 
investigation method used, the main structure remains constant. Thus, organizations miss 
valuable information that should be analyzed during this process such as previous 
incidents, leading indicators of the process, how the identified gaps fit into the current 
training material, and how to incorporate this learning into the management systems of 
the organization. Figure 19 presents a modified incident investigation process, in which 
additional steps have been incorporated into the traditional process with the objective of 
providing additional sources of information into the investigation. The grey boxes in the 
figure represent the steps that have been included, while the white boxes refer to the 
original structure of the incident investigation processes.  
After an incident occurs and is reported, the significance of the incident has to be 
determined. This refers to the categorization of the incident in which the potential impact 
of the incident is evaluated. Based on this result, the level of detail in the analysis and 
the complexity of it are determined. This means if simple methodologies and/or trend 
analysis are sufficient or a detailed analysis is required. Then, the collection of 
information and evidence has to be performed. This stage would determine the quality of 
the identified causes and recommendations [80]. Once the information has been 
collected, the incident investigation analysis is developed. In this stage incident 
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investigation methodologies are implemented for the reconstruction of events, the 
identification of critical and causal events and the identification of root causes of the 
incident.  
 
 
Figure 19 Proposed incident investigation process 
 
The following steps suggest a detailed analysis of previous internal and external 
incidents from which valuable information can be extracted. The analysis of external 
incidents gives the opportunity to retrieve missing lessons learned that the organization 
failed to learn. Thus, the applicability of those lessons learned can be evaluated into the 
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process. The objective of reviewing external incidents is not only to analyze the 
applicability of their recommendations to the incident that is being analyzed. It is also to 
analyze the current practices that others organizations are implementing, compare their 
own technology with respect to others organizations, and extend their existing 
knowledge regarding national and international standards and best practices that may be 
applicable to their facilities. Moreover, review of external incidents serves as support to 
explain the causes of the incident to the interested parties. This means helping build trust 
and credibility with regard to the results that the incident investigation team is 
presenting.  
Similarly, the analysis of internal incidents gives an opportunity to analyze 
incidents from the same organization, the process where the incident occurred and the 
safety performance of it. The analysis is based on the following criteria: are there any 
similar incidents? Or is there a significant amount of incidents/near misses in the same 
unit? The answer to the first question should be followed by a trend analysis and the 
evaluation of the applicability of previous recommendations into the incident that is 
being investigated. Conversely, the answer to the second question should be followed by 
a revalidation of the process hazard analysis for the process where the incident occurred.  
Then, the root causes that has been previously determined in this process have to 
be re-evaluated in order to ensure a complete picture of the analysis in which 
organizational and cultural flaws can be identified. Subsequently, the required changes 
in the management system should be identified. This stage of the investigation aims to 
provide more insights into the identification of root causes and successfully uncover 
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hidden faults of the system and avoid the identification of human error as root causes of 
the incident. The following step refers to the identification of the technical gaps that 
have been identified during the investigation. These gaps should be compared with 
respect to the current training material and provide recommendations to ensure that the 
training material is up to date and cover all relevant knowledge for each specific role in 
the organization. The last additional step incorporated into the process refers to the re-
evaluation of the leading indicators of the process to determine if the process is showing 
the right signals, the indicators are well defined and to ensure that operators understand 
the data and information the system is giving. The main objective of the additional steps 
is to ensure that root causes are identified and enhance the quality of the 
recommendations. Finally, the recommendations can be developed, implemented and 
lessons learned communicated. 
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6. CASE STUDY 
 
This section analyzes an incident that happened in the offshore industry in North 
America. The incident has been examined from the perspective of the proposed incident 
investigation flow chart presented in the previous section. The analysis comprises the 
analysis of two external incidents with similar causes and two internal incidents that 
occurred in the same organization. The data and information presented is real and 
verified. However, data have been anonymized in order to protect the identity of the 
organization. It should be note that the incident investigation has been performed by the 
organization at the time where the incident occurred. Therefore, the objective of this 
analysis is to identify improving opportunities of the final report through the analysis of 
similar incidents in the industry.  
 
6.1. Incident description 
6.1.1. Platform fire and explosion  
A high-pressure fuel gas line ruptured on a platform releasing high quantities of 
high-pressure gas, which detonated within next 5 seconds. The explosion and resulting 
fire killed 7 people and destroyed a significant part of the platform. The line was 
designed as a fuel gas separator bypass in order to provide operational flexibility. Thus, 
the line was used occasionally.  
Prior to the incident, the line had been inspected twice, once two years ago and 
another eight years ago. In both occasions, visual inspection, thickness measurement, 
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and materials characterization were performed. For those inspections, the results were 
satisfactory and no reduction of the internal thickness was detected, with the exception 
of a “weldolet” that was changed due to a severe external corrosion. The investigation 
found that the line rupture was due to a severe localized reduction of the internal 
thickness of the line. The laboratory analysis determined that the reduction of the 
internal thickness was the result of a combination of a microbiologically influenced 
corrosion (MIC) and corrosion associated with high levels of hydrogen sulfide (H2S).  
The identified causes of the incident, associated with prevention and detection of 
the incident, determined by the organization in the final report are briefly summarized 
below:  
 The fuel gas line was designed assuming that the potential presence of corrosion 
bacteria was zero 
 Bacteria corrosion mechanisms were not considered during the process hazard 
analysis performed in the unit 
 Safety, maintenance, and operational personnel were unaware regarding the 
presence of bacteria corrosion mechanisms in the platform 
 The fuel gas line was designed assuming that there would be insufficient quantities 
of H2S in the line to cause significant corrosion 
 There was no system in place for real-time monitoring to identify high levels of 
H2S in the fuel gas lines of the unit 
 The fuel gas line was not identified as a bypass line in the mechanical integrity 
program to design and perform the corresponding inspection program 
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 Personnel in the platform were unaware about the responsibility of communicating 
to the inspectors about bypass lines and dead legs to put special attention during 
the inspection 
 The potential combination of microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) and 
corrosion associated with high levels of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) was not considered 
into the corrosion inspection program 
 The supervisor in charge did not have the required knowledge to analyze the 
inspection results given by the inspection company 
Based on the identified causes of the incident some of the recommendations are 
briefly summarized below.  
1. Identify and monitor the type, origin, and effect of presented bacteria in the platform 
and design a tolerance level in order to establish control methods in the fuel gas 
system 
2. Update material selection criteria for fuel gas lines based on the types of damages 
mechanisms that in combination can influence corrosion velocities 
3. Analyze the operational feasibility of eliminating dead legs. Where applicable, 
implement the use of corrosion inhibitors in the fuel gas system for the corrosion 
mechanisms mentioned above 
4. Ensure the participation of a certified and experienced person in offshore corrosion 
mechanisms during the development of PHA’s 
5. Establish communicating procedures of bacteria detection between the platform 
personnel and inspectors. Additionally, identify all sporadic fuel gas lines in order to 
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update the inspection program and communicate the required planning and 
inspection 
6. Implement a real-time monitoring system to identify high levels of H2S in the fuel 
gas lines of the unit 
7. Implement corrosion coupons in the fuel gas system within the offshore platforms  
8. Validate  H2S operational limits and evaluate the operational and maintenance 
strategies for gas processing plants to ensure that permissible levels of H2S are not 
exceeded  
9. Redesign the corrosion inspection program to ensure that special conditions in the 
process such as bypass lines and dead legs and combination of corrosion 
mechanisms such as MIC and  H2S are considered 
10. Ensure that all personnel associated with planning, supervision, and execution of 
activities related to inspection, non-destructive tests, and mechanical integrity are 
certified and trained based on the applicable national and international regulations 
(being enunciated but no limit API 570, 572, 510, 574, 580, 581, 653) 
11. Develop and/or update static equipment inspection procedures to ensure that they are 
developed based on the applicable national and international regulations. 
Additionally, detection and control mechanisms for sporadic lines are included. 
Finally, detection of corrosion mechanisms associated with the combination of a 
MIC and corrosion associated with high levels of H2S 
12. Implement additional inspection techniques for the fuel gas lines that allows the 
identification of corrosion mechanisms such as MIC and H2S 
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6.2. Incident analysis 
The first step incorporated into the incident investigation process refers to the 
preliminary analysis in which the significance of the incident is determined. This means 
to categorize the incident based on the potential impact that the incident may have with 
the objective of determining the level of detail and complexity of the investigation. In 
this study, the significance of the incident was determined as very high due to the 
number of fatalities, injuries and property damaged. Thus, the incident was subject to 
further analysis during the investigation. The following seven steps were developed 
during the investigation performed by the organization: report incident, determine the 
significance of the incident, gather information, develop sequence diagram, identify 
critical events, identify causal factors, and identify root causes. The next step is the 
review of previous incidents, which has been developed in this section.  
6.2.1. Reviewing external incidents 
Review process of previous incidents takes into account two different types of 
incidents: internal and external incidents. Two incidents were considered for the external 
incident review process: the first incident is BP North Slope oil spill in 2006 and the 
second incident is natural gas pipeline rupture and fire in Carlsbad, New Mexico in 
2000.  
 BP North Slope oil spill, 2006: On March 2nd of 2006, a BP operator discovered a 
leak in a 34-inch transit pipeline. The leak turned out to be the largest spill ever 
experienced by Alaskan North Slope. The cause of the leak was due to an internal 
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corrosion that caused a hole at the bottom of the pipeline. The leak was associated 
with a microbiological corrosion caused by sulfate reducing bacteria [114].  
 Natural gas pipeline rupture and fire in Carlsbad, New Mexico, 2000: On August 19th 
of 2000, a 30-inch natural gas transmission pipeline ruptured. The released gas 
consequently ignited and burned for almost an hour. The incident killed twelve 
people and extensively damaged the infrastructure around. The investigation 
determined that the major safety issues were associated with pipeline design, the 
internal corrosion control program, the lack of federal safety regulations for natural 
gas lines, and the inadequate federal oversight [115]. 
The objective of reviewing external incidents is not only to analyze the 
applicability of their recommendations to the incident that is being analyzed. It is also to 
analyze the current practices that others organizations are implementing, compare their 
technology with respect to others organizations, and extend their existing knowledge 
regarding national and international standards and best practices that may be applicable 
to their facilities. Moreover, reviewing external incidents serves as support to explain the 
causes of the incident to the stakeholders. This means helping build trust and credibility 
with regard to the results that the incident investigation team is presenting.  
6.2.1.1. Corrosion statistics in the offshore industry 
The final report of the incident developed by the organization presented a 
detailed analysis regarding the microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) and 
hydrogen sulfide corrosion (H2S), supported by laboratory analysis and subject matter 
experts. However, due to the nature of the combined corrosion mechanisms, the 
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assimilation process from the operators, the supervisor and managers presented a 
challenge. Even though, the evidence was there, it was hard for them to believe “such 
unexpected event”. Therefore, some representative statistics in the offshore industry has 
been presented in order to highlight the frequency of this type of incidents in the 
offshore industry and consequently failure to learn from them. 
According to the US Department of Interior Minerals Management Service, 
almost 3000 offshore pipeline incidents were reported from 1970 to 1999, of which 51% 
of those were associated with corrosion as shown in figure 20 [116].  
Corrosion represents the leading cause of failure in the Gulf of Mexico offshore 
pipelines, counting for more than 1483 offshore corrosion incidents over the past years. 
Of these incidents, 35% were associated with internal corrosion and the remaining 65% 
with external corrosion [116]. Over the period from 1989 to 1999, 75% of the total 
number of reported corrosion incidents was associated with internal corrosion failures, 
showing a direct connection between internal corrosion and pipeline aging. Statistics 
indicates that additional factors such as pipeline infrastructure growing and changes in 
operating conditions also increase the likelihood of internal corrosion failures [116]. 
Likewise, statistics show that over the period from 1970 to 1999, the majority of internal 
corrosion failures occurred in natural gas pipelines, representing 67% (518 incidents) of 
the reported incidents [116]. Moreover, according with the U.S. Department of 
Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, even though the 
number of reported corrosion incidents in gas gathering lines is not that high, more than 
90% of those are caused by internal corrosion failures [117]. 
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Figure 20 US Gulf of Mexico offshore oil and gas pipeline types of failures over the 
period from 1970 to 1999, adapted from [116]  
 
6.2.1.2. Corrosion monitoring program 
BP North Spill incident report briefly outlined two key aspects that all pipeline 
corrosion management programs in the oil and gas industry may have such as a 
corrosion monitoring program and a pipeline leak detection system, which prevent a 
pipeline from developing leaks and ensuring prompt response once a leak occurs.  
At the time of the incident that is being analyzed, the organization did not have 
an effective internal corrosion-monitoring program for gas lines in place. Likewise, the 
platform did not have a pipeline leak detection system. The corrosion monitoring 
program that the organization had at that time involved visual inspection, thickness 
measurement, and hydrostatic testing. The investigation report recommend the 
implementation of a real-time monitoring system in order to identify high levels of H2S 
and the implementation of corrosion coupons in the fuel gas system. Additional 
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corrosion monitoring system can be considered based on the analysis of the current 
technology applied for different organizations. For example, BP North Spill incident 
report highlights the use of “smart pigs” in order to provide more coverage and the 
detection of smaller defects. Similarly, the investigation report developed by El Paso 
Natural Gas Company highlights the implementation of ultrasonic testing on the non-
piggable portions of the pipeline and the gas quality monitoring to ensure that predefined 
limits are not exceeded. Furthermore, the report briefly outlined some of the-state-of-the-
art technology described by the National Association of Corrosion Engineer (NACE) 
such as the implementation of Molecular Microbiological Methods (MMM) to 
monitoring internal corrosion mechanisms in the pipeline. Finally, BP North Spill 
incident report also emphasizes the technology that was implemented after the incident 
with respect to their pipeline leak detection system. The organization increased the 
number of field inspections and implemented infrared heat detectors to improve leak 
detection.  
Based on the results of the previous review of the two external incidents with 
regards to internal corrosion monitoring program and a pipeline leak detection system, 
the following recommendations can be incorporated into the final report: 
Recomendation1: Evaluate the implementation of the most suitable technology for 
internal corrosion monitoring in the gas pipeline system. The implementation of smart 
pigging, ultrasonic testing, and gas monitoring should be analyzed with respect to the 
existing technology.  
 
Recomendation2: Evaluate the feasibility of the implementation of the-state-of-the-art 
technology such as molecular microbiological methods in order to monitor bacteria 
activity. 
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Aligned with the previous recommendations and some of the recommendations 
stated in the report, the organization failed to effectively perform a complete 
management of change program for the incorporation of new technologies or systems 
into their existing safety management system. Thus, the required resources, expertise, 
and management commitment were not sufficient to fully prevent and mitigate this type 
of incident. In this particular case, the organization failed to provide the required training 
to the personnel in charge of analyzing and providing corrective actions during the 
inspections that were part of the corrosion-monitoring program. In this sense, even if the 
inspections were performed based on the schedule, there was a lack of expertise to 
conclude what was a good or bad result and provide the technical knowledge to 
determine the following corrective and preventing actions. Moreover, during the 
inspections performed in the unit, the replaced pieces were never subject to any type of 
further analysis in order to analyze the identified corrosion mechanism and the potential 
presence of additional corrosion mechanisms. Thus, bacteria activity and high levels of 
H2S were not identified during monitoring activities. El Paso Natural Gas Company 
incident report discussed some of the post-inspections activities that the organization 
performed as part of the corrosion-monitoring program. The organization selected some 
fractions of pipeline that was changed during inspection activities and performed 
metallurgical examinations to identify additional mechanisms of corrosion.  
Based on the previous discussion, the following recommendations can be 
incorporated into the final report: 
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Recommendation 3: Enforce the management of change program for the 
implementation of any new technology or system in which the required training, 
responsibilities, procedures and channels of communication must be specified.  
 
Recommendation 4:  Performed laboratory analysis of some of the portions of pipeline 
that have been replaced during inspections, in order to identify additional potential 
mechanisms of corrosion. 
 
6.2.1.3. Applicable standards  
The incident investigation report highlights some relevant applicable standards 
that must be incorporated into employees and contractors training. Likewise, the report 
recommends the inclusion of those standards into their existing inspection procedures. 
Those standards mentioned in the report are: being enunciated but no limit, API 570, 
572, 510, 574, 580, and 581, 653. However, additional standards can be taken into 
consideration. 
Complementary to the recommendation described in the report, El Paso Natural 
Gas Company incident report provides a more compressive description of the applicable 
standards regarding corrosion issues. This can help the organization to expand their 
knowledge and be aware of more sources of applicable information. Some of the 
applicable standards are mentioned below: - NACE SP0106-2006: Internal Corrosion Control in Pipelines - NACE Standard TM0106- 2006: Detection, Testing, and Evaluation of 
Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) on External Surfaces of Buried 
Pipelines  - NACE SP0206-2006: Internal Corrosion Direct Assessment Methodology for 
Pipelines Carrying Normally Dry Natural Gas  
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- ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission & Distribution Piping - ASME B31.8S Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines - ANSI GPTC Z380.1 Guide for Gas Transmission, Distribution, and 
Gathering Piping Systems, 2015 Edition 
Additionally, it is important to mention that those standards should not be used 
only for training and procedures purposes. It is important to verify that the current 
corrosion management program and internal policies and guidelines are aligned with 
those applicable standards. Thus, a complementary recommendation can be proposed: 
Recommendation 5: Revise and update as required the corrosion management program, 
policies and internal guidelines in order to ensure that are aligned and comply with all 
the applicable national and international standards.  Some of the applicable standards are 
mentioned below: - API 570, 572, 510, 574, 580, 581, 653 - NACE SP0106-2006: Internal Corrosion Control in Pipelines - NACE Standard TM0106- 2006: Detection, Testing, and Evaluation of 
Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) on External Surfaces of Buried 
Pipelines  - NACE SP0206-2006: Internal Corrosion Direct Assessment Methodology for 
Pipelines Carrying Normally Dry Natural Gas  - ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission & Distribution Piping - ASME B31.8S Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines - ANSI GPTC Z380.1 Guide for Gas Transmission, Distribution, and 
Gathering Piping Systems, 2015 Edition 
 
6.2.1.4. Corrosion management program 
Both external incidents emphasize the main elements involved in any corrosion 
management program and the required procedures and guidelines that may be in place in 
order to ensure that effective actions are performed with respect to prevention, 
mitigation and control. A corrosion management program should clearly address the 
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following elements: definition of policies and objectives, organizational structure and 
responsibilities, planning, procedures, and implementation, measuring system 
performance and finally reviewing system performance [91].  
Based on the incident report, the investigation revealed that the organization 
presented weaknesses in their existing corrosion management program. Analyzing some 
previous incidents in the same platform it can be seen that the platform present failures 
in their mechanical integrity program in general, not only with respect to corrosion. 
Although, inspections and corresponding activities are usually performed in accordance 
with the schedule (implementation phase of the corrosion monitoring program). In their 
program, some flaws can be identified in the planning and measuring system 
performance phases. The incident investigation reveals that during the planning phase, 
not all corrosion threats were identified and the required actions in case of the 
identification of any failure were not addressed effectively in the program. Likewise, the 
organization failed to effectively review and analyze the system performance in order to 
validate the effectiveness of the current corrosion prevention and monitoring methods. 
Based on this analysis, the following recommendation can be incorporated into the final 
report. 
Recommendation 6: Validate the corrosion management program to ensure that all 
types of corrosion threats are assessed and a risk assessment is performed.  The program 
should incorporate the following threats: Internal corrosion threat, external corrosion 
threat, safety/hazard threat, environmental threat and operability threat.
6.2.2. Reviewing internal incidents 
For the internal incident review, two incidents were considered. Both incidents 
occurred on the same platform 3 months and one-year back to the incident that is being 
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analyzed. The incidents were selected based on the criteria of cause similarity and 
incident unit. Additionally, documents such as previous process safety performance 
indicators, reliability report, and the mechanical integrity manual, were considered into 
the analysis.  
 Incident 1: A bitter water leak was detected in a 6” line from the low-pressure gas 
rectifier FA-3104 to the pressurized system, due to a material loss in the line. The line 
was out of service at the time of the incident. The investigation determined that the 
leak was caused by severe corrosion in the line. This due to the following causes: 
presence of trapped water on the line, there was not an action plan in place for 
removing off-line interconnections, and there was a failure to properly analyze and 
take actions of the inspections results developed by third parties. 
 Incident 2: During maintenance work in a mechanical valve, a minor gas leak was 
detected in the stem of the valve. The leak was controlled half an hour later. There 
weren’t any injured, environmental damaged or production losses. The investigation 
determined that the cause of the incident was due to a deterioration of the stem valve. 
Additionally, a severe corrosion was detected in the valve.  
While reviewing internal incidents, two approaches can be taken as presented in 
Figure 21. First, analyze if there are a significant number of incidents in the same unit 
where the incident occurred. The objective of the analysis is to find the need for re-
evaluating the process hazard analysis of the process. Secondly, to analyze similar 
incidents that had occurred in the same organization, to find trends and the applicability 
of those recommendations to the incident that is being investigated. Finally, the incidents 
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investigation team should go back to the identified root causes and re-evaluate them 
based on the identified findings.  
Even though, there was no record of a significant number of incidents in the same unit. 
The reported incidents have been classified with high significance. Moreover, the 
investigation report determined the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) performed in that 
process did not consider all different types of corrosion threats that can be present in fuel 
gas systems. Thus, it is highly recommended to re-evaluate the performed process 
hazard analysis, analyze those results and provide mitigation actions as required. 
Moreover, it is important to ensure that is executed by qualified personnel with relevant 
experience in offshore operations, corrosion mechanisms, and hazard identification 
methods.  
 
 
Figure 21 Reviewing internal incidents 
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In the second part of the analysis, similar incidents with similar causes were 
considered, along with additional process safety documentation that helped to provide 
more evidence into the analysis. The following improving opportunities to the existing 
investigation report were proposed:  
Recommendation 7: Re-evaluate the process hazard analysis performed in the fuel gas 
system of the platform, ensuring that is executed by qualified personnel with relevant 
experience in offshore operations, corrosion mechanisms, and hazard identification 
methods.  
 
6.2.2.1. Incident investigation program  
A third party hired by the organization was in charge of the development of the 
investigation report of the incident that is being analyzed. While both the internal 
incidents reports that were selected for this analysis, were developed by people inside of 
the organization. Although, the severity of both internal incidents is relatively low 
compared with the incident for the case study. Some inconsistencies were identified with 
respect to the level of detail of the analysis, the real identification of root causes, and 
quality of the recommendations. The analysis exposed that the organization had an 
inadequate incident investigation program, which inhibits the organization to learn from 
previous incidents. In this sense, it was unlikely that the organization would prevent a 
catastrophe like the one in this case study, because the identified causes in previous 
incidents were limited to the resolution of direct causes such as physical or human 
causes (changing a valve, replacing a section of the equipment or an employee 
temporary suspension). Aligned with this, a culture of blame was identified on the 
previous reports in which some recommendations tended to punish the operator instead 
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of analyzing the causes behind that behavior. Moreover, even if human and 
organizational causes were identified as root causes of those incidents, the following 
recommendations were focused just on immediate and physical causes. Hence, flaws 
were reflected in the incident investigation program and the provided training in this 
topic. In conclusion, a significant gap was identified between incident investigation 
reports developed in-house and incident investigation reports developed by a third party. 
Recommendation 8: Validate the current incident investigation procedure and 
methodologies applied by the organization, to guarantee that the identification of root 
causes is achieved during these processes. Likewise, ensure that the organization has a 
pool of experts in incident investigation methodologies as well as the overall incident 
investigation process.  
 
Recommendation 9: Validate and update their current incident investigation training 
material in order to ensure that the incident investigation process, requirements, and 
applied methodologies are explained with sufficient detail.  
 
Recommendation10: Ensure the investigation team receives a refreshing training prior 
any incident investigation, in order to guarantee that people in the team understand the 
main steps in the process, their role and responsibilities, and the expected outcomes of 
the investigation. 
 
6.2.2.2. Implementation of recommendations 
During the analysis of previous incidents, both incidents emphasize a failure to 
properly analyze and take actions of the inspections results developed by third parties. 
The incident used for this case study exposes the same cause in which the supervisor in 
charge was not able to analyze inspections results due to a lack of knowledge and 
training regarding this type of data. This is an illustration of how a lack of commitment 
with respect to the implementation of recommendations can lead to big catastrophes 
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such as the one that is being analyzed. Furthermore, this reflected a lack of enforcement 
and management commitment regarding the complete achievement of process safety 
management programs. Thus, even if activities were performed based on the program, 
no actual actions were performed with respect to the analysis and recommendations of 
those results, making it hard for the organization to improve and make their processes 
safer.  
Additionally, in incident 1, one of the recommendations suggested the 
development of an action plan for removing off-line interconnections in the platform. 
The recommendation was ranked with high priority. Despite the associated risk, the 
recommendation was never implemented and the same recommendation was identified 
in the final report of the incident used in this case study.  
Recommendation 11: Ensure that recommendations from incident investigations, 
inspections or audits are easily understood for the operators and supervisor in charge of 
the process. Likewise, ensure that the personnel in charge of the implementation of those 
recommendations have the required knowledge and training to interpret this type of 
information. Moreover, ensure an adequate follow-up program in which the periodic 
status of recommendations is reported to the management level.  
 
6.2.2.3. Safety management system 
In analysis of the internal documentation mentioned previously and the incident 
in this case study, it can be concluded that there is a lack of proper channels of 
communications among the different groups of people that interact in the same process. 
This means, that people in charge of the development of process hazard analysis, 
inspections, and the daily operators are not aligned with respect of the identified hazards 
in the process and how they have to work together in order to define the best approach to 
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take for the process. With all things considered, it was concluded that the different 
elements of the safety management system of the organization do not aligned properly 
and do not interact with each other. Thus, the mechanical integrity, training or 
management of change programs are not fully aligned with the process hazard analysis 
and compliance audits elements of the safety management system in the platform.  
Recommendation 12: Ensure that safety management programs of the organization are 
aligned with the process hazard analysis and audit programs performed in the facility. 
Ensure appropriate channels of communication, training and qualified personnel to 
defined effective prevention and mitigation measures.  
6.2.3. Identifying changes required in the management system and updating 
training material 
Following the review of previous incidents, the next step in the proposed process 
is the identification of the changes needed in their management systems, which are 
exposed during the development of the incident investigation. This stage of the 
investigation aims to provide more insights into the identification of root causes and 
successfully uncover hidden faults of the system. Through the analysis of the identified 
causes of the incident, review of previous internal and external incidents, and an analysis 
of the current state of their management system, relevant changes in the management 
system were identified for this case study.  
 The analysis suggested that changes in the current training need-matrix are necessary 
to ensure that personnel have the required knowledge and experience to perform 
their responsibilities on the platform. This means to validate that the required 
training for a specific role is up to date and the identified gaps (Corrosion 
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management program, applicable corrosion standards, incident investigation 
program) are filled by the organization.  
 The management of change program should be re-evaluated to ensure that changes in 
technologies or processes take into account the potential impact on training needs, 
roles responsibilities, and channels of communications among the organization.  
 The mechanical integrity program should be validated to assure that the planning 
phase of the program is developed for a group of qualified personnel with relevant 
experience of the process and products in the platform. Likewise, the analysis 
suggested validating the current personnel selection criteria for the development of 
process hazard analysis.  
 The investigation suggested an overall change in the safety culture of the 
organization in which the level of engagement and awareness of the top management 
need to be re-evaluated, as wells as the operational discipline and incident 
investigation program.  
 Within the suggested changed in the safety culture of the organization, the 
operational discipline program should be re-evaluated in order to ensure that the 
organization is taking an appropriate approach for communicating and enforcing 
procedures, standards and policies. Additionally, the audit program must be validated 
to ensure that the auditors are qualified to perform the job and that audit procedures 
are adequate, available and understood by employees.  
 Together with the two previous arguments, the incident investigation program should 
be re-evaluated to ensure that appropriate methodologies are applied and that the 
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incident investigation process, procedures, and roles and requirements are well 
established and understood.  
Aligned with the analysis performed in this step, it is also important to evaluate 
which training material should be updated based on the technical gaps that were 
identified during the investigation. For instance, during the development of this case 
study, technical and organizational gaps such as internal corrosion monitoring program, 
identification of corrosion threats, and applicable corrosion standards and best practices 
we identified as current gaps in their training material. Similarly, the incident 
investigation training material should be validated to ensure that proper methodologies 
for root cause identification are implemented within the organization and the basis of an 
effective incident investigation program are covered in this training.  
6.2.4. Closing up the process 
The next step in the analysis is to re-evaluate the leading indicators of the process 
where the incident occurred. This with the objective of identifying the fact that if the 
process is showing the right signals and making sure those operators understand the data 
and information the system is giving. The case study identified that appropriate 
indicators were in place. However, performance indicators reports were usually 
presented without any analysis behind it, making difficult to understand the actual state 
of the process. The presentation of these indicators was limited to the comparison of the 
result with respect to the predefined goal of the year. In this sense, the results are 
presented in a very high level and no analysis of the data was performed. Thus, the 
learning process cannot be achieved because no actual transformation of the data into 
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information and knowledge is performed. Given these arguments, the following 
recommendation can be incorporated into the final report. 
Recommendation 13: Re-evaluate the objective of the existing leading indicators in the 
process, in order to verify how the results can help to understand the process behavior 
and what actions can be taken with respect to these results. Similarly, ensure that 
performance indicators reports are followed by the corresponding analysis of the 
obtained results. 
Thirteen additional recommendations were developed to the final incident 
investigation report. Additionally, six changes in the existing management system and 
the required changes in their current training material were suggested. The 
recommendations need first to be validated for people inside the organization and the 
management's approval is required. The next steps in the process are to assign the 
recommendations and finally share the lessons learned. Those steps are out of the scope 
of this case study. However, the results are going to be presented to the organization and 
the following steps will depend on the decision made by them. 
6.2.5. The case study into the learning process 
The first step in the learning process has been explained to illustrate how incident 
investigations can be enhanced and quality information can be incorporated into the 
existing corporate learning system. The following steps in the process require the 
implementation of a pilot test inside the organization in order to determine the actual 
performance of the potential alternative and the system.  Therefore, a hypothetical case 
has been developed for one of the recommendations proposed on the previous analysis. 
The steps two to seven were developed for recommendation 5. 
 Second step: acquire information 
 137 
 
Enhancing internal information also gives the opportunity to identify additional 
sources of information that can be used in the future for different facilities or groups of 
people. In this sense, the selected external incidents (BP North Slope oil spill, 2006 and 
Natural gas pipeline rupture and fire in Carlsbad, New Mexico, 2000) can be grouped 
together based on the type of incident or the associated causes (Internal corrosion). Then, 
this information can be linked to the document management system, so people would 
have access in case similar information is needed for future investigations or operational 
inquiries.  
 Third step: Assess alternative 
During this stage, the corporate learning team identifies the potential scope of the 
recommendation, the benefits, potential cost, and the associated risk. Based on this 
analysis, the recommendation would be considered as a potential alternative that should 
be incorporated across the organization. - Scope: the recommendation that is being analyzed involves the review of the 
mechanical integrity program and corrosion guidelines of the platform where the 
incident occurred. Since some of these documents are transversal for the 
organization, the initial identification should be performed at a corporate level, 
follow by the adjustment of internal procedures and implementation of specific 
activities at a facility level. - Benefits: the implementation of the alternative would ensure that the 
organization is operating in a legal and safe manner. In this sense, the 
organization would implement international corrosion standards, which enables a 
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consistent interpretation and implementation of the corrosion management 
program. Likewise, it would support external and internal auditing process to be 
more consistent with respect to results of inspections and process indicators of 
the process. Moreover, this would enable the organization to potentially 
minimize legal liability and be more competitive around the world.  - Cost: the cost would be determined in terms of the number of people required in 
the initial identification of gaps with respect to the applicable standards and the 
current corrosion program and guideline, and the cost of a subject matter expert 
who would serve as an advisory during this phase. Similarly, the time and 
resources needed to update the documentation, the training required, and finally, 
the time and resources needed for implementation of specific activities at each 
facility level.  - Risk: the likelihood of having another similar incident associated with internal 
corrosion would potentially decrease if appropriate corrosion management 
guidelines are in place, people are trained, and the documentation is consistently 
interpreted and implemented within the organization.  
For the initial identification, a work team is required. In this team the corporate 
learning team would work together with three representatives of the process safety 
department (who are part of mechanical integrity team) and an external subject matter 
expert with relevant prior experience in corrosion management as well as a strong 
knowledge in international corrosion standards suggested in this recommendation. 
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A preliminary plan has been developed to determine how the recommendation 
would be implemented and the people in charge of the execution of each task. The plan 
was divided into three phases: identification phase, implementation at a corporate level, 
and implementation at a facility level. Table 8 to 10 present the preliminary plan for the 
revision and updating of the corrosion management program and guidelines based on the 
applicable international standards.  
 Fourth step: Define metrics 
A set of indicators has been proposed to track the performance and progress of 
the alternative. The indicators were defined based on the three phases of the action plan. 
Identification phase: - Percentage of standards reviews completed according to the schedule  - Number of non-conformances to non-regulatory corrosion standards per year 
Implementation at a corporate level: - Percentage of activities completed according to the schedule - Percentage of people trained on the incorporated standards 
Implementation at a facility level:  - Percentage of activities completed according to the schedule - Percentage of people trained on the incorporated standards - Number of facilities that identified the required changes and developed an action 
plan  - Number of facilities that performed the required changes  - Number of audits in which the work team participated 
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- Number of incidents associated with corrosion per year - Number of repeat non-conformances in all facilities per year - Number of inconsistencies or issues identified in all facilities during the 
implementation phase 
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Table 8 Action plan - Identification phase 
 
 
Item Activity Responsible 
Timeline 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Identification phase 
1 Review current corrosion management program  Work Team             
2 Review inspection and maintenance guidelines for 
pipeline systems 
Work Team             
3 Review NACE SP0106-2006 and NACE Standard 
TM0106- 2006 
Work Team             
4 Review NACE SP0206-2006 and ANSI GPTC 
Z380.1 
Work Team             
5 Review ASME B31.8 and ASME B31.8S Work Team             
6 
Identify gaps in the current corrosion program and 
inspection and maintenance guidelines for pipeline 
systems 
Work Team             
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Table 9 Action plan - Implementation at a corporate level 
 
Item Activity Responsible 
Timeline 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Implementation at a corporate level 
7 
Update corrosion management program and 
inspection and maintenance guidelines for 
pipeline systems 
Work Team                 
8 Define the appropriate risk tolerance criteria or guidance  Work Team                 
9 Perform a management of change process Work Team                 
10 Document sources for potential changes Work Team                 
11 Define technical and regulatory knowledge needed for compliance Work Team                 
12 Define expectations for each facility Work Team                 
13 Define audit schedule to verify compliance Work Team                 
14 Communicate to all appropriate personnel Work Team                 
15 Provide training needed for compliance and auditing  Work Team                 
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Table 10 Action plan - Implementation at a facility level 
Item Activity Responsible 
Timeline 
M
 9 
M
 
1
0 
M
 
1
1 
M
 
1
2 
M
 
1
3 
M
 
1
4 
M 
1
5 
M
 
1
6 
M
 
1
7 
M
 
1
8 
M
 
1
9 
M 
2
0 
M
 
2
1 
M
 
2
2 
M
 
2
3 
M
 
2
4 
Implementation at a facility level 
16 
Update inspections and maintenance 
procedures 
Each Facility                                 
17 
Perform a management of change 
process 
Each Facility                                 
18 
Provide training needed for 
compliance of procedures 
Each Facility                                 
19 Perform audits based on schedule Each Facility                                 
20 
Participate in audits as necessary to 
ensure that auditors are qualified and 
verify appropriate information 
Work Team 
                                
21 Perform review meeting  Work Team                                 
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 Fifth step: refine alternative 
Since the alternative has been designed transversal for all the organization. The 
execution of the first two phases is required first in order to determine how the 
alternative is expected to be implemented for each type of facility and consequently 
determine the specific subtasks required for each of them. For the execution of the third 
phase, the work team would define the expectations for each facility. This would 
facilitate the level of detail in auditing and documentation for each facility.  
 Sixth step: implement alternative 
This step involves the execution of each of the task defined in the action plan. 
During the first phase of the plan, gaps were identified with respect to the integrity 
management program elements. More specifically, gaps associated with the integrity 
threat classification and the identification of the potential pipeline impact by threat. 
Thus, the standard “ASME B31.8S Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines” was 
the primary source of information for the following phases. During the second phase of 
the plan, the corrosion management program and inspection and maintenance guidelines 
were updated, communicated and the mechanical integrity personnel were trained. For 
the last phase, each facility had to developed a sub plan in which activities such as the 
reevaluation of the process hazard analysis need to be performed based on the results of 
the management of change process. Moreover, each facility was in charge of defining 
the people who need to be trained such as supervisor and operators.  
 Seventh step: monitor performance 
For the last step of the process, review meetings were scheduled to verify the 
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progress for each facility, identified common difficulties, and analyzed preliminary 
results of the alternative. Similarly, results of the proposed indicators for the alternative 
were analyzed, refreshing training was provided and actions were taken based on these 
results. Finally, the work team participated in some of the audits performed in the 
facilities in order to verify that auditors are qualified and used the appropriate standards. 
This case study was developed with the objective of explaining the proposed 
incident investigation process and providing a clearer picture of how it can be 
implemented within the existing incident investigation programs. Moreover, it illustrates 
how investigations can be enhanced through a more detailed analysis to identify the root 
causes and consequently achieve high-quality recommendations. Finally, it explains how 
the case study fits together in the complete learning process through a hypothetical 
implementation of one of the proposed recommendations.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
7.1. Conclusions 
In this thesis, a systemic process for improving learning from incidents has been 
developed for the chemical and oil and gas industry based on the identified limitations of 
the learning system. It consists of seven steps that enable organizations to acquire 
relevant safety information, absorb it and transform it into valuable safety knowledge 
that can be incorporated into the organizational management systems. The framework is 
intended to provide a holistic view of the learning from incident process and explore the 
concept of integration of knowledge management into safety learning systems. 
Additionally, the limitations of the learning system and the main elements that 
organizations should take into account to improve learning have been discussed in order 
to enhance understanding of this field. Finally, the proposed incident investigation 
process was explained through the development of a case study in which an incident 
investigation report was enhanced by the identification of improving opportunities for 
the existing safety management system of the organization.  
This work provides a holistic view of the learning from incident process, which 
comprises the development of a corporate learning system, providing guidelines of how 
learning systems can be executed within the organization and how to support the 
implementation of safety knowledge inside of it. The proposed learning process is 
intended to serve as a tool to disseminate and analyze safety knowledge across the 
organization. Likewise, it is intended to support single and double-loop learning since it 
 147 
 
converges a detailed analysis of the underlying causes of incidents, provides the 
opportunity for analysis from different perspectives and examines of potentially valuable 
information for the organization. Moreover, the proposed learning system gives some 
empirical and theoretical insights into the implementation of learning incidents into real 
organizations for the chemical and oil and gas industry. In this context, the framework 
aims to provide a more integrated perspective to this field by the incorporation of 
psychological and engineering inputs into the analysis.  Finally, this work give a bigger 
picture of the learning from incidents process and overcome some of the limitations that 
the industry faced with regard to this field.   
Knowledge management theory has been applied for the purpose of defining the 
role of safety knowledge in an organization, developing a knowledge culture in which 
knowledge transfer is encouraged, and finally developing a knowledge structure that 
incorporated technical and human elements into the system [104]. The study of this 
research is restricted to enhance internal learning in an organizational level. Therefore, 
the scope of this thesis was limited to an organizational learning inside the organization. 
The identified limitations in the learning system have been addressed as follow:  
 The implementation of lessons learned and sharing knowledge within the 
organization have been the focus of this study. Even though, the available literature 
highlights the importance of sharing and implementing lessons learned [15, 18], the 
purposes of this study is focused ensuring the implementation of lessons learned in 
all facilities where it may be applicable, and not just in the facility where the incident 
occurred. Thus, the implementation of a corporate learning system inside the 
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organization aims to ensure that the lessons learned are not just communicated and 
disseminated, but also analyzed and documented for all the facilities. Similarly, 
sharing knowledge within the organization is encouraged in the corporate learning 
system by the flows of information in and out that are established from and to all 
facilities that are part of the organization. 
 The use and understanding of academic resources and databases are encouraged in 
the second step of the proposed learning process: acquire information. The 
identification of external resources has been identified as the key feature of this 
process in order to get valuable safety information that may be applicable to the 
organization. Thus, the importance of using databases, external associations, and 
academic resources has been discussed. 
 The identification of root causes is enhanced by the incorporation of additional steps 
into the traditional incident investigation process. These steps provide some 
guidelines to the incident investigation team in terms of identifying more insights 
during the analysis, by the incorporation of additional sources of information that can 
give more clarity and detail with respect to the organizational, technical and cultural 
flaws of the organization. Similarly, the proposed process gives a holistic view by 
the identification of the required changes in the management system and current 
training material of the organization. Additionally, the proposed incident 
investigation process encourages the validation of leading indicators of the process in 
order to ensure that operators and supervisors are getting the right signals to identify 
technical failures in the system.  
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The applicability of the proposed process has been explained through the analysis 
of an investigation report of an incident in the offshore industry. The obtained results 
provide a clear picture of how the process can be implemented within existing incident 
investigation programs. Moreover, it explained how investigations can be enhanced 
through a more detailed analysis in the identification of root causes and how high-quality 
recommendations can be achieved. 
 
7.2. Future work 
Based on the limitations and the scope of this research, the performed study can 
be complemented by the analysis in the following areas: 
 The DIKW (Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom) theory has been used in this 
study in order to leverage the safety knowledge within an organization. The 
proposed learning process provides a clear understanding of how to transcend data 
and information into knowledge. However, the concept of wisdom has not yet been 
clearly defined in this research. Thus, the analysis of why organizations are not 
getting wisdom, which elements are necessary to achieve it? and analyzing the 
relationship between learning and wisdom in organizations can be a new area of 
study in this field.  
 The concept of individual learning has been discussed in this research in a high 
level. Therefore, the necessary elements to achieve individual learning, best 
approaches to learn, and the relationship between learning and individual 
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characteristics such as age, motivation, and perception can be further analyzed to 
understand how these factors can influence the level of retention in individuals.  
  The concept of sharing knowledge within the organization has been discussed and 
how learning systems can be implemented in organizations. However, tools and 
methods for delivering this knowledge have not been covered in this research. 
Evaluating the benefits and effectiveness of different types of tools would help 
organizations to enhance learning at both individual and organizational level.  
 A case study was developed to explain how the proposed incident investigation 
process can be implemented in organizations. Likewise, a theoretical insight was 
presented of how the case study fits into the complete learning process. The 
proposed framework of improving learning from incidents should be tested through 
the development of a pilot in a real organization for a particular group of facilities. 
This would give the opportunity to validate the complete process and refine it. 
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